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NOTES
1976 DEVELOPMENTS IN WELFARE LAW-
AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN*
Amidst continuing rhetoric about a major reform of our wel-
fare system, the country still struggles with an unwieldy bureauc-
racy largely devised in 1935 by the Social Security Act.' This Note
focuses on recent developments in one of the most controversial
parts2 of our present system-Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC).3 Under AFDC, the federal government pro-
vides funds to state-administered programs that meet federal
guidelines.4 The state agencies, in turn, pay benefits to eligible in-
dividuals.
The past year was a mixed one for AFDC recipients. Holding
true to its tendency to limit welfare recipients' access to federal
courts,5 the Second Circuit in Andrews v. Maher6 flatly rejected four
theories on which AFDC plaintiffs have relied for federal jurisdic-
tion. In another setback, two court decisions-one federal 7 and one
state--limited recipients' right to redress for wrongful public dis-
closure of AFDC files. But AFDC recipients gained ground as well.
A federal statute9 and a Supreme Court decision" now seem to
require federal courts to grant attorney's fees in many cases to
successful AFDC plaintiffs.
* The author wishes to thank Lynn Wintriss for her assistance in the preparation of this
Note.
I Act of Aug. 14, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
2 See Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 825 (1974).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-660 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). AFDC provides benefits to "needy de-
pendent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living." Id. § 601 (1970).
4 States have broad discretion to set standards of need and levels of benefits, but they
may not impose conditions unrelated to need that exclude persons eligible under federal
standards. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
See, e.g., Freda v. Lavine, 494 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1974); Hagans v. Lavine, 471 F.2d 347
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969);
Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
6 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975).
7 Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 547 F.2d 436
(8th Cir. 1977).
1 Pajewski v. Perry, 363 A.2d 429 (Del. 1976).
9 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970)).
10 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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I
JURISDICTION OVER AFDC SUITs:
NARROWING THE ENTRANCE TO FEDERAL COURT
In a host of recent lawsuits, AFDC recipients have contended
that rules or practices of state AFDC programs do not conform to
the Social Security Act." Although federal courts have recognized
several bases for assuming jurisdiction over such claims in the past
and Congress has recently expanded federal jurisdiction, 12 some
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421
U.S. 707 (1975) (claim that denial of AFDC-UF to father receiving unemployment compen-
sation violates Social Security Act); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) (claim that denial of
AFDC benefits to unborn children violates the Social Security Act); Roselli v. Affleck, 508
F.2d 1277 (1st Cir. 1974) (claim that flat grants violate the Social Security Act).
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. V 1975) requires states to furnish aid "with reasonable
promptness to all eligible individuals." In what is known as the King-Townsend-Remillard
trilogy (King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971);
Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972)), the Supreme Court ruled that this provision
bars states from imposing non-need eligibility conditions not found in the Social Security
Act. However, states have broad discretion to set financial eligibility criteria and levels of
benefits. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 541 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 478-80 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970); Note, 1975
Developments in Welfare Law-Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 777,
798-99 n. 163 (1976).
12 For purposes of determining possible federal jurisdiction, AFDC claims divide into
three categories. First, recipients challenge state rules or institutionalized practices as un-
constitutional or inconsistent with the Social Security Act. Part I of this Note discusses four
theories for getting such claims into federal courts. The second category includes claims by
individuals injured by isolated instances of state violations of federal statutory standards. In
Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir.
1977), a federal court refused to hear this type of case. See notes 201-31 and accompanying
text infra. Finally, AFDC recipients challenge federal regulations as inconsistent with the
Social Security Act. These plaintiffs can obtain federal court review under mandamus juris-
diction (28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970)) or federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West
Supp. Dec. 1976)). Section 1361 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
Two federal courts have invoked § 1361 to review federal AFDC regulations. Jackson v.
Weinberger, 407 F. Supp. 792, 795-96 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); National Welfare Rights Organi-
zation v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861, 866-67 (D.D.C. 1974). See Note, Federal Jurisdiction
over Federal Welfare Claims, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 817-23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Federal Jurisdiction]. A 1976 amendment to § 1331 removed the $10,000 amount in
controversy requirement for any action involving a federal question and brought against
the United States or its officials. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat.
2721. Section 1331 now provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
1977] 1051
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federal courts have nevertheless narrowed the jurisdictional av-
enues available to AFDC plaintiffs. Whether prompted by over-
crowded dockets13 or an unwillingness to supervise state welfare
practices,' 4 courts have shown increasing reluctance to decide the
merits of welfare claims.' 5
Typifying this trend, the Second Circuit in Andrews v. Maher1 6
severely restricted access to a federal forum to challenge state wel-
fare practices. The Andrews plaintiffs challenged the application of
a Connecticut regulation 7 that requires a recipient to appear
periodically at a district office for an eligibility redetermination
interview." An informal state rule exempts from this requirement
recipients living more than twenty-five miles from the nearest dis-
trict office; instead, these recipients are visited at home by a
caseworker. 9 The state does not pay travel or child care expenses
United States except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such
action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or
employee thereof in his official capacity.
AFDC plaintiffs have already successfully used the amended section to gain access to fed-
eral courts to challenge federal regulations. Green v. Philbrook, 427 F. Supp. 834, 836 (D.
Vt. 1977). Arguably, plaintiffs challenging state practices-the first kind of suit--could also
gain federal review under the new § 1331 by including in their complaint a count against
federal officials for failure to ensure compliance with the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 604 (1970).
13 Cf. Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 578-86 (1974) (crowding in federal appellate courts).
14See Reyes v. Edmunds, 416 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn. 1976); Morris v. Danna, 411 F.
Supp. 1300 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977). With only one
exception (Freda v. Lavine, 494 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1974)), federal courts have not abstained
from hearing challenges to state welfare practices, and the Supreme Court has specifically
refused to require welfare plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies. King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 312 n.4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). See also Mendoza
v. Lavine, 412 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (jurisdiction retained to allow pretrial prepara-
tion while administrative process continued). However, Professor Redlich has shown that
federal courts have discretion to refuse to hear welfare cases on either abstention or ex-
haustion grounds. Redlich, The Act of Welfare Advocacy: Available Procedures and Forums, 36
ALB. L. REV. 57, 84 n.114 (1971).
15 See Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975); Reyes v. Edmunds, 416 F. Supp.
649 (D. Minn. 1976); Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd per curiam,
547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977). Cf. Linkenhoker v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1975)
(summary judgment vacated as moot); Hagans v. Wyman, 527 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1975)
(remand for consideration of mootness question raised by change in challenged regulation);
Note, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 800-02 (judicial and legislative "federalizing" of
welfare has reduced federal jurisdiction available to welfare plaintiffs).
16525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975).
17 1 CONN. REGS. §§ 17-2-29 to 31 (1975).
18 525 F.2d at 115. For a more detailed description of the facts see Andrews v. Norton,
385 F. Supp. 672, 675-77 (D. Conn. 1974).
19 525 F.2d at 115.
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incurred by those who must appear in person. Failure to report for
redetermination is grounds for termination of benefits. 20
The plaintiffs, a class of AFDC recipients living within the
twenty-five mile radius, challenged the regulation and rule on both
constitutional and statutory grounds. They argued that the practice
violated the equal protection clause because it arbitrarily created
two classes of persons, one of which must incur extra expenses to
maintain AFDC eligibility. 2I They also argued that the rules vio-
lated the Social Security Act by imposing an unauthorized condi-
tion of eligibility. 22 Affirming a lower court dismissal,23 however,
the Second Circuit rejected all four theories under which the plain-
tiffs alleged federal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs first propounded their constitutional claim as the
sole foundation for access to federal court.24 Both their equal pro-
tection claim and their allegation that the state's practices violated
the Social Security Act stated federal causes of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.25 Only the constitutional claim, however, unques-
tionably fulfilled the narrower requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1343,26
the jurisdictional counterpart of section 1983. Once jurisdiction
20 1 CONN. REGS. § 17-2-30(a) (1975).
21 525 F.2d at 116-17.
22 Id. at 115-16. See note I Isupra.
23 Andrews v. Norton, 385 F. Supp. 672 (D. Conn. 1974).
24 525 F.2d at 116-17.
25 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-(4) (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
Plaintiffs specifically relied upon the language of § 1343(3) granting jurisdiction over cases
claiming deprivation of any right "secured by the Constitution." By itself, plaintiffs' claim
under the Social Security Act provided only arguable grounds for jurisdiction under
§ 1343(3) because that section applies only to statutes "providing for equal rights of citi-
zens." See notes 45-48 and accompanying text infra.
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was established by the constitutional claim, the court could hear the
statutory claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction because
both issues shared a "common nucleus of operative fact."'27 Al-
though the probability of ultimate success on their constitutional
claim was questionable, 28 plaintiffs contended that it was suffi-
ciently substantial under the Supreme Court's rule in Hagans v.
Lavine29 to allow a federal court to hear the stronger statutory
challenge.3 11 Under the Hagans rule, a constitutional challenge is
jurisdictionally sufficient to support a pendent statutory claim if
the challenged regulation is not "so patently rational as to require
no meaningful consideration' 1  and the question raised is not
"foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme] Court. ' 32 The Ha-
gans Court, recognizing that the regulation before it might have
had a rational basis,33 nevertheless ruled that plaintiffs' challenge
to that regulation presented a constitutional question sufficiently
substantial to support a pendent statutory claim.3 4 Since the court
announced this broad substantiality test in the context of an AFDC
complaint,35 Hagans seemed to guarantee access to federal courts
to welfare recipients who could present even tenuous constitutional
claims.3 6
The Second Circuit, however, did not view Hagans as ensuring
access to the federal courts. It affirmed the district court's de-
termination 37 that the Andrews equal protection argument was in-
2 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (3d ed. 1976).
28The court found it insubstantial. 525 F.2d at 116-18. See notes 37-44 and accom-
panying text infra.
29 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
3o 525 F.2d at 116-17.
31 415 U.S. at 541.
12 d. at 543 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666
(1974)).
33 415 U.S. at 541-42.34 1d. at 542-43. In support of this finding, the Court stated that it was "unaware of
any cases in this Court specifically dealing with this or any similar regulation and settling
the matter one way or the other." Id. at 539 (footnote omitted).
31 The plaintiff AFDC recipients in Hagans challenged a New York regulation "permit-
ting the State to recoup prior unscheduled payments for rent from subsequent grants
under the AFDC program." Id. at 531 (footnote omitted).
"6 See Note, Hang On, Pendent Jurisdiction-Here Comes Hagans v. Lavine, 6 CONN. L.
REV. 747 (1974); Note, The Outlook for Welfare Litigation in the Federal Courts: Hagans v.
Lavine & Edelman v. Jordan, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 897, 898-903 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Outlook for Welfare Litigation]; Case Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Supreme Court
Strains to Provide a Federal Forum for Challenges to State Administration of Welfare Programs, 59
MINN. L. REV. 761 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Federal Jurisdiction].
" Andrews v. Norton, 385 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D. Conn. 1974).
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substantial, even under the Hagans test.3 8 The circuit court cited
Supreme Court decisions applying a reasonableness test to the
merits of constitutional challenges to state welfare practices. 39 The
court then applied the same reasonableness standard to the
threshold question of the substantiality required to support juris-
diction over a pendent claim.4°1 Connecticut's classification was rea-
sonable 4' because a state may "reasonably limit its administrative
offices in order to minimize costs, '42 and "[a] state legislature is
constitutionally free to decide not to provide reimbursement for
travel costs in its AFDC grant, however desirable such reimburse-
ment would be."' 43 Thus, while professing to follow the Hagans test,
the Second Circuit adopted a more stringent standard formerly
applied only to the merits of a constitutional claim. 44
38 525 F.2d at 117.
39 Id. (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (higher percentage reduction
factor applied to AFDC benefit award than to other welfare programs); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (social security benefits reduced to reflect workmen's compen-
sation benefits); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (absolute maximum imposed
on AFDC benefits to family regardless of size)).
40 525 F.2d at 117-18. The Supreme Court in Hagans rejected the reasonableness test
in the jurisdictional context. The Hagans Second Circuit panel had applied the reasonable-
ness standard of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), to the challenged regulation
and found the challenge insubstantial, because the regulation had a rational basis. Hagans
v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973). Conceding that the regulation might be
rational when judged on the merits (415 U.S. at 542), the Supreme Court nevertheless
reversed the Second Circuit, because the regulation's reasonableness was "not immediately
obvious from the decided cases or so 'very plain' under the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
(footnote omitted). Thus, although Hagans and cases cited therein (e.g., Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)) use
language of reasonableness in defining the substantiality test for jurisdiction, post-Hagans
plaintiffs seeking only access to a federal court should face a far easier hurdle than those
urging that a regulation is unreasonable on the merits.
41 Although arguably reasonable, the classification was not beyond reproach; it did not
provide for those within the 25 mile radius who found travel difficult or impossible (e.g.,
the handicapped).
42 525 F.2d at 117 (footnote omitted).
43 Id.
4' The Second Circuit ignored not only the Supreme Court's specific refusal in Hagans
to apply a reasonableness test to the jurisdictional issue (see note 40 supra), but also the
policies both explicit and implicit in Hagans. Arguably, Hagans represents a Supreme Court
decision that despite crowded dockets, federal courts should hear all good faith claims
charging inconsistency with the Social Security Act. The Court first hinted at this policy in
1970 when it wrote:
[The Social Security Act] question is so essentially one "of federal policy that the
argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly strong."
It is . . . peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the welfare field
than in other areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal funds
allocated to the States are being expended in consonance with the conditions that
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1050
As a second jurisdictional basis, the plaintiffs argued that 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3)45 encompassed their federal statutory claim inde-
pendent from any constitutional issues. This subsection provides
federal jurisdiction over suits alleging state violations of rights
"secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens."' 46 The Second Circuit
had previously ruled, however, that the Social Security Act does
not provide "for equal rights of citizens. '47 Therefore, the plain-
tiffs urged the court to disregard the "equal rights" language of
subsection 1343(3) and find that the statute conferred jurisdiction
over any section 1983 action. 4
8
Substantial authority supported the Andrews plaintiffs' expan-
sive reading of subsection 1343(3). In Blue v. Craig,49 the Fourth
Circuit found that subsection 1343(3) encompasses all 1983 ac-
Congress has attached to their use.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404, 422-23 (1970) (footnote omitted). The Hagans deci-
sion also invokes the unique expertise of the federal courts in construing federal statutes,
particularly in applying preemption principles in supremacy clause cases. 415 U.S. at
548-50. See Comment, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 36, at 772-73. The Andrews court
recognized that a federal forum would be appropriate for plaintiffs' claims but neverthe-
less denied jurisdiction. 525 F.2d at 119-20.
Commentators have argued that the federal interest in Social Security Act programs,
the inadequacy of administrative remedies, and the expertise of federal courts in interpret-
ing the Social Security Act provide sufficient justification for federal courts to stretch the
limits of their jurisdiction to include all beneficiary complaints. See Cover, Estadblishing Fed-
eral Jurisdiction in Actions Brought to Vindicate Statutory (Federal) Rights when no Violations of
Constitutional Rights are Alleged (pt. I), CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Feb.-March, 1969, at 5;
Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
9-12 (1970); Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 1404, 1405 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Welfare Challenges]; Note, Federal
Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 802. In other welfare cases, circuit courts, including the Sec-
ond Circuit, have noted the limitations Hagans imposed on the substantiality test for juris-
diction. See Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294, 1295-96 (2d Cir. .1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
954 (1976); Maggett v. Norton, 519 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1975); Glover v. McMurray,
507 F.2d 1325, 1326 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974); Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F.2d 1066, 1068 (3d Cir.
1974); Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032, 1036 (10th Cir. 1974). But see Randall v. Gold-
mark, 495 F.2d 356, 359 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). The text of the statute is set out in note 26 supra.
46 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
47 Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1101 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1146 (1974); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1082 n.9 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 944 (1972); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1969); Rosado v.
Wyman, 414 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
Accord, Young v. Harder, 361 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D. Kan. 1973); Acosta v. Swank, 325 F.
Supp. 1157, 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
48 525 F.2d at 118.
49 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974). In Blue, medicaid recipients charged that the state's
failure to pay their expenses for travel to and from places providing medical services vio-
lated the Social Security Act.
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tions. 50 After reviewing the history of sections 1983 and 1343(3), 51
the Blue court construed the statute's reference to equal rights
"not so much as a term limiting the scope of the statute but rather
as a term intended to spread the jurisdictional umbrella of the
federal courts over any actions authorized under statutes enacted
to give effect to the Fourteenth Amendment, including specifically
§ 1983. ' 52 Despite Blue, and scholarly opinion from which the de-
cision drew support,53 the Second Circuit held that subsection
1343(3) does not create federal jurisdiction over actions-includ-
ing section 1983 actions-based solely on violations of the Social
Security Act.54 The court relied on the weight of its own prior de-
cisions 55 and the Supreme Court's refusal to decide the issue in
reaching this result. 56
The third jurisdictional allegation raised in Andrews was also
drawn from Blue. Once again citing subsection 1343(3), the Andrews
plaintiffs argued "that a claim that state welfare regulations violate
the Social Security Act is in fact a claim, under section 1343(3), of
deprivation of rights 'secured by the Constitution,' because such a
claim cannot succeed without ultimate resort to the Supremacy
51 Id. at 839.51 Id. at 836-39. The court pointed out that Congress originally enacted §§ 1983 and
1343(3) together in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
52 505 F.2d at 838. Accord, Vazquez v. Ferre, 404 F. Supp. 815, 824 (D.N.J. 1975).
Contra, Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356, 359 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
53 See Cover, supra note 44; Herzer, supra note 44; Note, Welfare Challenges, supra
note 44.
54 525 F.2d at 118.
-5 See cases cited at note 47 supra. The Fourth Circuit in Blue squarely faced the Sec-
ond Circuit's objections to finding subsection 1343(3) coextensive with section 1983. First,
the Blue court recognized the concern, expressed in McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250
(2d Cir. 1969), that welfare cases would overwhelm federal courts adopting the coextensive
rule. The Fourth Circuit answered that Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422 (1970), en-
couraged federal courts to hear welfare cases, so long as provisions for federal administra-
tive supervision of the states were insufficient. 505 F.2d at 840. Second, the Fourth Circuit
pointed out that in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972), the
Supreme Court rejected the distinction between personal rights and property rights used
by the Second Circuit in Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1081-82 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972), and McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1969). 505
F.2d at 840-41. Finally, Blue stated that both policy reasons and the legislative history of
subsection 1343(3) militated against the restrictive reading of "equal rights" espoused by
the Second Circuit in McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1969); rather, federal
jurisdiction should extend to all § 1983 claims. McCall, said the Fourth Circuit, illogically
infers a Congressional intent to create a federal right and simultaneously deny access to
the only forum capable of enforcing that right. 505 F.2d at 841-42.
56 525 F.2d at 118. The Supreme Court declined to resolve the issue of the scope of
§ 1343(3) in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974).
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Clause. '57 In Blue, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the Supreme
Court's treatment of jurisdiction in welfare cases "point[s] ines-
capably to the conclusion ... that a claim that a state statute or regu-
lation is inconsistent with federal law poses a constitutional is-
sue under the Supremacy Clause, jurisdictionally cognizable under
§ 1343(3). '118 The Second Circuit, however, rejected the plaintiffs'
argument, stating that "it transforms statutory claims into constitu-
tional claims by verbal legerdemain. '" 59 Citing only one case as au-
thority,60 the court ruled that the plaintiffs were actually seeking to
vindicate rights conferred by statute and not by the supremacy
clause; the clause itself "does not secure rights to individuals," 61
but "states a fundamental structural principle of federalism. '62 Al-
though this reading settles the question in the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court may yet find merit in the notion that federal su-
premacy, once asserted, inures to the benefit of individuals and is
a right secured by the Constitution. 3
Finally, plaintiffs urged the Second Circuit to hear their claim
under subsection 1343(4),64 which creates federal jurisdiction over
claims for "relief under any Act of Congress providing for the
s 525 F.2d at 118.
56 505 F.2d at 844. Accord, Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973). See
Note, The Outlook for Welfare Litigation, supra note 36, at 902-03.
59 525 F.2d at 118-19. Accord, Prigmore v. Renfro, 356 F. Supp. 427, 430 (N.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd mern., 410 U.S. 919 (1973); Gage v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 356 F. Supp.
80, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (by implication).
60 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). In Swift, the Court held that a
supremacy clause challenge to a state law did not present a constitutional question requir-
ing a three-judge district court. However, in Hagans the Supreme Court noted:
But Swift itself recognized that a suit to have a state statute declared void and to
secure the benefits of the federal statute with which the state law is allegedly in
conflict cannot succeed without ultimate resort to the Federal Constitution-"to be
sure, any determination that a state statute is void for obstructing a federal statute
does rest on the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution."
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533-34 n.5 (1974) (quoting Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382
U.S. 111, 125 (1965)). See also Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 843-44 (4th Cir. 1974);
Connecticut Union of Welfare Employees v. White, 55 F.R.D. 481, 486 n.1 (D. Conn.
1972).
61 525 F.2d at 119.
62 Id.
63 See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974). The Hagans Court, recognizing
that the supremacy clause issue remains undecided, cited Connecticut Union of Welfare
Employees v. White, 55 F.R.D. 481 (D. Conn. 1972) as representing one line of argument
on the question. 415 U.S. at 533 n.5. The court in White asserted: "If the state policy is in
conflict with the federal statute, . . . this would deny plaintiffs a right secured by the
Constitution-namely, the right to secure the benefit of the Supremacy Clause." 55 F.R.D.
at 486 (footnote omitted).
64 The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) is set out in note 26 supra.
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protection of civil rights. ' 65 As with the "equal rights" problem
encountered under subsection 1343(3),66 the plaintiffs faced the
obstacle of prior Second Circuit cases holding that the Social Se-
curity Act does not provide "for the protection of civil rights. 67
They approached this hurdle with an ingenious argument. Their
claim, it was alleged, had two distinguishable levels. 68 The primary
level consisted of a suit under section 1983, a statute that is part
and parcel of a civil rights act.69 It therefore brought plaintiffs'
claim within subsection 1343(4). Only on a secondary level, not
pertinent to jurisdiction, did plaintiffs' claim arise under the Social
Security Act. The provisions of the Social Security Act would de-
termine whether or not the state had deprived plaintiffs of a right
secured by federal laws, but it was section 1983-a civil rights
act-that gave rise to plaintiffs' right to redress for violation of
those laws.70
This subtle argument has carried plaintiffs over the "civil
rights" hurdle of subsection 1343(4) in a number of courts.71 The
Andrews court was willing to grant that subsection 1343(4), origi-
nally enacted only as the jurisdictional counterpart of the Civil
Rights Act of 1957,2 had been expanded by the Supreme Court to
encompass other civil rights acts.73 Nevertheless, the Second Cir-
cuit declined to take what it termed "the possibly large jurisdic-
tional step plaintiffs urge[d]. 74 The court believed that "plaintiffs'
theory takes a claim which in any normal understanding is based
65 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
66 See notes 45-56 and accompanying text supra.
67 Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1082 n.9 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
944 (1972); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir. 1969).
68 525 F.2d at 119.
69 /d.
70 Id.
7t Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 842 (4th Cir. 1974); Gomez v. Florida State Employ-
ment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 580 n.39 (5th Cir. 1969); Mathes v. Nugent, 411 F. Supp. 968,
970 (N.D. Il1. 1976); Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945, 949 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
dismissed per curiam, 464 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1971); Worrell v. Sterrett, [1968-1971 Transfer
Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 1 10,575 (N.D. Ind. 1969). Contra, Randall v. Goldmark, 495
F.2d 356, 359-60 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
72 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 5, 28 & 42 U.S.C.). See Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356, 360 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11 (1957);
Cover, supra note 44, at 25; Herzer, supra note 44, at 18; Note, Welfare Challenges, supra
note 44, at 1427-28.
73 525 F.2d at 120. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554 (1969) (suit
under Voting Rights Act of 1965); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 n.1
(1968) (suit under Civil Rights Act of 1866).
74 525 F.2d at 120.
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on the Social Security Act, and says that it is really based on some-
thing else, because something else must be invoked before relief is
available."7 5 Further, according to the panel, section 1983 provided
a procedure for the protection of civil rights but did not actually
provide for any civil right.76 Finally, the court chose to rely on the
original congressional purpose of subsection 1343(4) rather than
the Supreme Court's expansive reading of the provision. 77
The Andrews decision severely limits a welfare plaintiff's access
to federal courts in the Second Circuit. It sets a higher jurisdic-
tional standard of substantiality for constitutional claims than the
Supreme Court announced in Hagans. Moreover, Andrews rejects
three alternative theories of jurisdiction that welfare plaintiffs have
successfully urged in other federal courts. As Blue demonstrates,
there is now a significant split among the circuits concerning the
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The future course of the unde-
cided circuits on these issues is unclear. If, however, courts con-
sider the policy arguments of Blue and the scholarly opinion on
which the decision largely rested-7 8 -arguments and authority that
went virtually unnoticed in Andrews79-the balance may shift in
favor of welfare recipients.
II
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN AFDC LITIGATION
In 1976, two developments in federal law virtually guaranteed
that AFDC recipients who successfully challenge state AFDC rules
and practices in federal court will receive attorney's fees awards .8 1
7 5 d. at 119.
76Id. The Fifth Circuit dismissed this problem, saying: "[Section] 1983, although
operating as a conduit through which other statutory rights are protected, is itself an 'Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights.'" Gomez v. Florida State Employ-
ment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 580 n.39 (5th Cir. 1969). See generally Cover, supra note 44, at 7,
24; Herzer, supra note 44, at 17-18; Note, Welfare Challenges, supra note 44, at 1427.
77 The court wrote:
But there is a difference between extending section 1343(4) to laws such as these, [the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965] which protect specific rights
and engender comparatively little litigation, and applying it to section 1983, which pro-
tects all rights "secured by the Constitution and laws."
525 F.2d at 120.
78 See sources cited in note 53 supra.
79 The Andrews court acknowledged that Blue gave plaintiffs' § 1343(3) argument a
"surface plausibility" (525 F.2d at 119), but did not go on to consider that case before
rejecting plaintiffs' jurisdictional theory.
8" The substantive and jurisdictional bases for bringing AFDC litigation in federal
court are set out in notes 24-32 and accompanying text supra.
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In June, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of the constitution-
ality of such an award. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 8' held that congressional
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment overrides eleventh
amendment restrictions on suits against states. 82 The Court thus
ensured the constitutionality of federal legislation authorizing
an award of legal fees to litigants who enforce their fourteenth
amendment rights against states and state officials . 3
Shortly after the Fitzpatrick decision, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (CRAFAA).84 Filling a
gaping hole in the federal common law of fee awards,85 the Act
grants federal courts discretion to award legal fees to the prevailing
party in suits based on various provisions of specific civil rights
acts.8 6 Among the specified provisions is 42 U.S.C. § 1983,7 the
statute granting a federal right to relief in most AFDC suits.8 8
Significant in their own right, these developments in the law
also raise a number of issues concerning the continuing role of
legal services organizations in welfare litigation. May legal services
organizations continue to accept AFDC cases brought under sec-
tion 1983? May the courts awdrd legal fees to such organizations?
May the organization accept fee awards? The 1976 Act itself, prior
case law, and public policy considerations demonstrate that legal
services organizations should continue to represent AFDC litigants
and should reap the rewards of the 1976 Act.
A. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
CRAFAA 9 is a boon to AFDC litigants. Prior to the enactment
81 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
82 Id. at 456.
83 See id.84 Fitzpatrick was decided June 28, 1976. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970)),
was enacted October 19, 1976. The text of the Act is reproduced in note 89 infra.
89 See notes 96-100 and accompanying text infra.
86 The Act applies to suits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986 (1970) and 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1970). Most AFDC litigants allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See
notes 21-32 and accompanying text supra.
87 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The text of this section is set out in note 25 supra.
s8 See notes 25-32 and accompanying text supra.
89 The substantive provision of the Act reads as follows:
In any action or proceeding to enfore a provision of sections 1981 to 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, chapter 38 of Title 20, or in any civil action or proceeding,
by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a viola-
tion of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or subchapter V
of chapter 21 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. Dec. 1976).
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of this legislation, successful AFDC plaintiffs generally could not
recover legal fees.9' Under the traditional American Rule,91 courts
may not award attorney's fees to successful parties absent specific
statutory authorization 92 or circumstances that permit the use of
one of three equitable exceptions to the rule. Because of the harsh
effect of the general rule, courts have made frequent use of the
bad faith, 93 common fund or benefit,94 and private attorney gen-
eral95 doctrines to encourage citizens to enforce their rights.
In 1975, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Aleska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society96 rejected the private attor-
9" See notes 93-95 infra.
91 "In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a rea-
sonable attorneys' fee from the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 247 (1975). The Supreme Court first recognized this rule in Arcambel v. Wise-
man, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). For further discussions of the American rule and its
application, see McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal
Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 765-70, 779-82 (1972); Comment, Liability for Attorney's
Fees in the Federal Courts-The Private Attorney General Exception, 16 B.C. INDUS. & CoNt. L.
REv. 201, 201-07 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Private Attorney General]; Note,
Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 717 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Exceptions]; Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 637-44 (1974); Comment, Attorneys' Fees: Only Congress Can Award
Compensation to Private Attorneys General, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1071, 1072 [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Congress Can Award]; 80 DICK. L. REv. 852, 854-55 (1976).
92 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) (attorney's fees allowed to prevailing party in suit
for discrimination or segregation in places of public accommodation).
93 Under this exception, a court uses its equity powers to punish a losing party who
has acted frivolously, vexatiously, or wantonly, or who has abused the legal processes. See,
e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.
1976), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 479 (1977) (AFDC plaintiffs); Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d
Cir. 1974) (AFDC plaintiffs). See also Note, Exceptions, supra note 91, at 726-29.
9' This exception applies when a successful litigant has created a fund or wins a ruling
that benefits an ascertainable class of people. The court invokes its equity powers to distrib-
ute the cost of litigation by paying legal fees out of the fund or by assessing fees against a
party capable of distributing the cost to the beneficiaries of the litigation. See, e.g., Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970).
See also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 282-88 (1975) (dis-
senting opinion, Marshall, J.); Note, Exceptions, supra note 91, at 729-33.
91 Following Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), lower
courts began awarding fees to parties who promoted a public interest-private attorneys
general. Although Newman involved an award authorized by statute, courts expanded the
holding to apply to any litigation concerning an important public interest, particularly suits
raising environmental and civil rights issues. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.,
444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd,
488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974). AFDC recipients benefited
from this exception in Rodriguez v. Trainor, 67 F.R.D. 437, 439 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Cf.
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1974) (state welfare pay-
ments). See also Comment, Private Attorney General, supra note 91, at 211-30; Note,
Exceptions, supra note 91, at 733-37.
96 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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ney general doctrine and severely limited the applicability of the
common fund or benefit theory. Prior to Alyeska, these two doc-
trines had been the most useful tools for justifying awards to public
interest litigants. 97 The bad faith exception survived Alyeska, but
instances of actual bad faith on the part of defendants in public
interest litigation are rare.98 In sum, Alyeska severely limited judi-
cial discretion to provide financial incentives for the vindication of
civil rights. 99 The Court deferred to Congress to designate issues of
sufficient public importance to justify attorney's fees awards.l00
Congress quickly accepted the Court's invitation "to pick and
choose among its statutes and to allow attorneys' fees under some,
but not others.""' Passed in reaction to Alyeska,'102 CRAFAA pro-
vides incentives for private citizens to enforce their civil rights
where money damages may not be available.1 113 In suits under vari-
ous statutes,' 0 4 including the one invoked by most AFDC liti-
97 See notes 94-95 supra. See also Townsend v. Edelman, 518 F.2d 116, 123 (7th Cir.
1975) (demonstrating futility of AFDC plaintiffs trying to come within common fund or
benefit exception as narrowed by Alyeska).
O0 But see, e.g., Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1976) (bad faith found in
two-year delay in implementing program required by statute), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 479 (1977);
Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975) (bad faith found in refusing to allow abor-
tions in city hospital after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220
(1976). See also Note, Attorneys' Fees--''Bad Faith" Exception-Attorneys' Fees Allowed Under Bad
Faith Exception After Alyeska Decision Narrowed "Private Attorney General" Doctrine, 8 CONN. L.
REV. 551 (1976); Note, Exceptions, supra note 91, at 726-29, 736-37; Comment, Congress Can
Award, supra note 91, at 1081-82.
99 In reaction to the Alyeska decision, some authorities urged expansion of the remain-
ing equitable exceptions to encourage public interest suits. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 285 (1975) (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.) (common
fund or benefit exception). Compare Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1976)
(bad faith exception invoked), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 479 (1977), with Townsend v. Edelman,
518 F.2d 116, 123-24 (7th Cir. 1975) (no bad faith found).
100 421 U.S. at 263-64.
ao Id. at 263.
102 Both the Senate and House reports and the debates on the Act show that Congress
intended to fill the gaps left by the Alyeska decision. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 1, 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5909, 5911-12
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; 122 CONG. REC. S16,431 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976)
(remarks of Sen. Hathaway); 122 CONG. REc. H12,159 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of
Rep. Drinan).
103 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 1; SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 2-5, [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5909-13. Congress provided this incentive in other civil
rights legislation, considering it necessary to promote the protection of all citizens. For a
list of provisions analogous to CRAFAA, see HousE REPORT, supra note 102, at 13 (Appen-
dix A).
104 See note 86 supra.
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gants, 1 5 "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs.' 1 1 6
Although the brief text of the Act1 7 provides little guidance
concerning the specifics of its application, judicial construction of
nearly identical statutes and the legislative history of CRAFAA it-
self suggest the scope of its operation. The legislative history indi-
cates that a court may award legal fees even if it ultimately decides
a case on the basis of a claim ancillary to one enumerated in the
Act.""' Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, courts may award
attorney's fees while the action is pending even if the party receiv-
ing the award does not ultimately prevail." 9 To encourage out-of-
court settlements, the legislative history provides that a party may
prevail "through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining
relief" and still receive a fee award.110 The Act applies to all cases
105 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970). See 122 CONG. REc. S17,053 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976)
(remarks of Sen. Abourezk); 122 CONG. REC. H12,159 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of
Rep. Drinan).
:06 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. Dec. 1976).
107 See note 89 supra.
'
0 8 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 4 n.7. Where a claim subject to a fee award
statute involves a constitutional question, a court may obscure the fee award issue by decid-
ing the case on the basis of a nonconstitutional ancillary claim that is not encompassed by
the fee award statute. According to the House Report, a court may still award fees in this
situation.
In such cases, if the claim for which fees may be awarded meets the 'substantiality'
test, see Hagans v. Lavine, [415 U.S. 528 (1974)] . . . . attorney's fees may be al-
lowed even though the court declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that
claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee claim arising out of a 'com-
mon nucleus of operative fact.'
Id. A fortiori, CRAFAA allows attorney's fee awards where the plaintiff's victory rests on a
pendent claim covered by CRAFAA, but not independently cognizable in federal court.
This situation may arise frequently since welfare plaintiffs, to obtain federal jurisdiction,
often append § 1983 claims based on state violations of the Social Security Act to § 1983
claims alleging constitutional infringements. See notes 21-32 and accompanying text supra.
But see note 163 infra.
109 SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5912-13;
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 8. The reports cited Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696,
722-23 & n.28 (1974) (interim award under 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. 11 1970)) and Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970) (award under common fund or benefit
exception before creation of fund).
110 SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5912;
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 7-8. See Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457
F.2d 1377, 1383 (4th Cir.) (injunction against discrimination denied where employer volun-
tarily eliminated practices, but plaintiff awarded attorney's fees), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970) (plain-
tiff who secured no relief but acted as "catalyst" for employer's elimination of discrimina-
tion awarded fee); Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 121 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir.
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pending on October 19, 1976, the date of enactment."'
According to the terms of the Act, a court may award at-
torney's fees "in its discretion."' 1 2 This discretion is limited. The
Senate Report, quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,"'
states that "[a] party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the
statutes covered by [the 1976 Act], if successful, 'should ordinarily
recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust.' 11114 Moreover, in Northcross v. Board of
Education," 5 the Supreme Court interpreted a statute similar to the
1976 Act as requiring courts to justify any denial of fees to a
prevailing plaintiff." 6 Thus, the 1976 Act leaves courts litde lat-
itude in deciding whether or not to award legal fees when the
plaintiff prevails.
Although fee awards may be a matter of course for prevailing
plaintiffs, prevailing defendants' requests for fees will face closer
scrutiny." 7 The tension between two purposes of the Act requires
this asymmetrical result. Congress wished to mitigate the "chilling
effect"' 18 of prospective plaintiffs' fears of being forced to pay
1941) (defendant awarded attorney's fees where plaintiff voluntarily dismissed claim with-
out prejudice); Parker v. Mathews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1061-65 (D.D.C. 1976) (plaintiff
awarded attorney's fees after settlement); Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 65
F.R.D. 541, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff awarded attorney's fees after consent decree);
Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D. Ore. 1969) (plaintiff denied
damages and injunction because discrimination unintentional, but awarded attorney's fees).
11 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 4 n.6 (citing Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696
(1974)). See also Larson, The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 778, 780-81 (1977); Note, Federal Appellate Procedure-Statutory Authorization for Award-
ing of Attorneys' Fees Applied Retroactively to Services Rendered Prior to Its Enactment, Despite an
Absence of Language or Legislative History Indicating It Was to Be Applied to Pending Cases, 24
DRAKE L. REV. 435 (1975).
112 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. Dec. 1976).
113 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
114 SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 4, [1976] U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEWS 5912
(quoting 390 U.S. at 402) (emphasis added). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 6.
115 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam).
11 6 Id. at 427-28. See also Note, Exceptions, supra note 91, at 720-21. The House Report
cites both Newman and Northcross with regard to determining the proper standard for
awarding fees in civil rights actions. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 6. These cases
are particularly pertinent, because they involve statutes having the same language and
purpose as the 1976 Act. SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 2-5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5909-13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 1, 5-6.
117 As the Newman Court pointed out, this stricter standard is appropriate in light of
the Act's purpose to encourage private persons to protect their rights. Successful plaintiffs
should expect fee awards. 390 U.S. at 402 & n.4. Successful defendants, however, should
have no such expectation because the Act is designed to discourage only the most frivolous
plaintiffs. For a discussion of how courts have applied this standard, see Note, Exceptions,
supra note 91, at 720-22. See also Larson, supra note 111, at 778-80.
'Is HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 7.
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defendants' legal fees.1 1 9 At the same time, Congress did not want
to encourage vexatious or frivolous suits. 2 " To resolve these
conflicting goals, the committee reports instruct courts to deny
the prevailing defendant's request for attorney's fees unless the
plaintiff's conduct was vexatious, harassing, or in bad faith.' 2 ' This
amounts to little more than a restatement of the bad faith excep-
tion to the American Rule. 122
The 1976 Act allows courts to award "a reasonable attorney's
fee," 123 but provides no guidance on how to measure the amount
of an award. The legislative history stresses that courts should
award "fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but
which do not produce windfalls to attorneys."'1 24 Both the House
and Senate reports endorse the standard applied in Johnson v.
1191d.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5912.
120 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 7; SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 5, [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5912. Congress faced the same dilemma in enacting the at-
torney's fees provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1970). See Comment, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Standards for Award of Attorney's Fees
to Prevailing Defendants, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 207, 218-20 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Title
VII Standards].
121 HOUSE REPORT, Supra note 102, at 7; SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 5, [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5912. The reports cited several decisions applying the bad
faith standard for awarding fees to prevailing defendants under a nearly identical stat-
ute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 726-29 (2d
Cir. 1976) (fee awarded where suit "motivated by malice and vindictiveness"); Wright v.
Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1975) (award denied where plain-
tiff showed sufficient good faith even though claim dismissed for failure to show prima
facie case); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 362-65 (3d Cir. 1975)
(defendant denied fee where government's demand for information not "unfounded,
meritless, frivolous or vexatiously brought"). Student commentators considering Title VII
fee awards have concluded that this standard properly avoids discouraging good faith
plaintiffs. See Comment, Title VII Standards, supra note 120, at 221-22 (better to tolerate
some meritless cases than to discourage one case with merit); 80 DICK. L. REV. 852, 860
(1976) (defendant should not receive benefits afforded plaintiffs because defendant not
"cloaked in the same veil of public interest").
Some commentators argue that a defendant prevailing against the government should
enjoy the same standard as the prevailing plaintiff. The policy of encouraging private en-
forcement does not apply in such cases, and courts should discourage the government
from bringing frivolous suits. See United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871, 872 (D.R.I.
1970); Note, Exceptions, supra note 91, at 721 & n.53; Comment, Title VII Standards, supra
note 120, at 227-30. But see United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359,
362-65 (3d Cir. 1975).122 See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
123 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. Dec. 1976).
124 SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 6, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5913.
See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 9.
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Georgia Highway Express, Inc.'2 5 The Fifth Circuit panel in Johnson
listed twelve factors to be considered in determining the amount of
an award: time and labor required; novelty and difficulty of the
questions; skill required to perform the legal service properly; pre-
clusion of other employment due to acceptance of the case; cus-
tomary fee; whether the fee is fixed or contingent; time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; amount involved and
'result obtained; experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyers;
"undesirability" of the case; nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and awards in similar cases.126 Trial
courts enjoy great discretion in applying these standards,12 7 but
they must hold an evidentiary hearing on the measure of fees12 8
and explain how they arrived at an amount. 129
In sum, CRAFAA, viewed in the context of its legislative his-
125 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 8; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 102, at 6, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5913.
,26 488 F.2d at 717-19. The Johnson court acknowledged the similarity between its
standards and those suggested by the American Bar Association to guide attorneys in set-
ting fees. Id. at 719. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 2-106 (1974).
The use of these standards by courts to set fee awards has received mixed comment.
Compare Comment, Computing Attorney's Fees in Class Actions: Recent Judicial Guidelines, 16
B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 630, 632-33 (1975), with 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1354, 1359-61
(1974). At least two circuits, however, have adopted the Johnson factors. See Evans v. Shera-
ton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d
885, 890 n.7 (9th Cir. 1974).
In Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973), a case involving a fee award following settlement of an antitrust action,
the Third Circuit provided some guidance as to how the various factors should be weighed
and interrelated when measuring fees. The court should first determine the number of
hours the attorneys worked and what lawyers engaged in which activities. Id. at 167. The
court must then value the time spent by applying the lawyers' normal billing rates, which
may vary with the class or status of the attorney and the type of activity. Id. at 167-68. The
court then applies these rates to the hours worked to find "the only reasonably objective basis
for valuing an attorney's services." Id. at 167. Two additional factors then enter the com-
putation: the "contingent nature of success" and "the quality of an attorney's work." Id. at
168. The court may increase the award if it finds the action had little chance of success or
the lawyer did high quality work. Id. at 168-69. Although neither committee report cites
Lindy specifically, both reports comment favorably on the standards used in antitrust cases.
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 102, at 8-9; SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 6, [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5913.
127E.g., Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1972); Green v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 326 F.2d
492, 496 (1st Cir. 1964).
128 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222, 223 (1970) (per curiam).
129 This requirement facilitates appellate review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Kiser
v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d
177, 186-89 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Std.
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1973).
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tory and the judicial treatment of its sister acts, is tailor-made for
the AFDC litigant in federal court. Section 1983 actions raising
constitutional questions as well as pendent claims that a state has
violated the Social Security Act 130 presumptively entitle a successful
plaintiff to a fee award, 13' even if the pendent nonconstitutional
claim provides the sole basis for relief.' 31 Interim awards and
awards in settled actions are available.' 33 Courts have announced
standards for fee awards in other contexts which future courts can
use to compute awards under the 1976 Act.' 34 The private bar
should take note of this expansion in the power of federal courts to
award attorney's fees.
B. Constitutionality of Fee Awards Exacted from States
Because most AFDC litigants sue states or state officials, 35
state treasuries will pay the legal fees awarded to such plaintiffs
under CRAFAA. A 1974 Supreme Court case, however, cast doubt
upon the constitutionality of such an award. In Edelman v. Jordan136
the Court held that the eleventh amendment severely restricts a
federal court's power to award damages against a state. 137 Al-
though the standard pronounced in Edelman was unclear,138 it ar-
guably barred fee awards against states under the 1976 Act.' 39
More recently, however, the Supreme Court avoided this result.
135 See notes 24-32 and accompanying text supra.
131 See notes 112-16 and accompanying text supra.
132 See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
133 See notes 109-10 and accompanying text supra.
134 See notes 125-29 and accompanying text supra.
135 See notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra.
136 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
1371d. at 663. Although the eleventh amendment does not literally prohibit citizens
from suing their own states in federal court, it has consistently been construed to that
effect. Id. at 662-63. In fact, the Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment as con-
stitutionalizing sovereign immunity. See Comment, Federal Powers and the Eleventh Amend-
ment: Attorneys' Fees in Private Suits Against the State, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1167, 1172-82 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Eleventh Amendment]; Comment, Suits Against State Officials:
Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 53 TEx. L. REV. 85, 87 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Suits Against State Officials].
138 One commentator concluded that Edelman allows any-award that leaves a state a
choice-to pay damages or to follow some other course of action-no matter how unrea-
sonable that choice may be. See Comment, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 137, at 1182-94.
139 Before Edelman, courts relied on the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Amos
v. Sims, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), aff'g mem. 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.) (per curiam) (three-
judge court) and 336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala.) (per curiam) (three-judge court), when
awarding attorney's fees against states. See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d
885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1973). Subse-
quently, courts split on whether Edelman prohibited fee awards against states. Two circuits
allowed awards. See Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1139 (lst Cir.) ("fees are incidental
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In Edelman, the district court had ordered Illinois to pay ret-
roactive welfare benefits that had been wrongfully withheld during
a three-year period. 4  The Supreme Court found this award indis-
tinguishable from a damage award against the state, an award pro-
hibited by the eleventh amendment.' 4 ' The Court narrowly distin-
guished Ex parte Young, 142 the seminal case allowing federal courts
to entertain suits for prospective relief against state officials.
According to the Edelman court, the payments ordered in cases
decided under the Young doctrine had only "an ancillary effect on
the state treasury"' 43 and were "the necessary result of compliance
with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature."' 44
to the main litigation, which, being for injunctive and declaratory relief, was permissible
under the eleventh amendment"), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Class v.
Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1974) (fee has only an "ancillary effect" on state treasury
and is a "necessary result of attempts to gain compliance"). Three circuits denied them.
Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974) (award "measured in terms of a mone-
tary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975);
Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 1974) (award paid from general revenues of state
barred), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 42-43
n.7 (3d Cir. 1974) (Edelman "clos[es] the door on any money award from a state treasury in
any category"), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975). See Comment, Eleventh Amend-
ment, supra note 137, at 1197-98, 1201-02; Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1875, 1895-98 (1975); Comment, Suits Against State Officials, supra note 137,
at 93-102.
14°Jordan v. Swank, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 15,135 (N.D.
I1. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973). The plaintiffs
represented the class of Illinois applicants for Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled
(AABD), a federally funded, state-administered, categorical assistance program created
under the Social Security Act (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1970)). Replaced by Supplemen-
tal Security Income (42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (Supp. V 1975)) in 1974, AABD's structure
resembled AFDC's; federal statutes and regulations controlled state administration of the
program. The Jordan plaintiffs contended that Illinois did not comply with 45 C.F.R.
§ 206.10(a)(3) (1972), which required states to determine the eligibility of aged and blind
persons within 30 days of application and the eligibility of disabled persons within 60 days
of application. This regulation was superseded in 1973 to extend the time period for aged
and blind persons to 45 days. See 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1976).
141 415 U.S. at 668.
142 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Young, the Court held that the eleventh amendment did
not bar a federal court from hearing a suit against a state official acting under an allegedly
unconstitutional state law. Young, the attorney general of Minnesota, had attempted to
enforce railroad rates that violated the fourteenth amendment. Upholding a federal court's
injunction against further enforcement by Young, the Supreme Court created the fiction
that a suit against a state official was not a suit against the state. Without the Young fiction,
federal courts would have no means to compel state compliance with the Federal Constitu-
tion. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 208-10 (3d ed.
1976); Comment, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 137, at 1181-82.
143 415 U.S. at 668.
144 Id.
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Recognizing that "the difference between the type of relief barred
by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte
Young will not in many instances be that between night and day," 145
the Court overturned the retroactive award. It found the award
was not "a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with
a substantive federal-question determination"'146 but rather was
"measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach
of a legal duty."'147 The circuits split on whether Edelman barred
attorney's fees awards against states,1 48 thus setting the stage for a
Supreme Court test.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 149 gave the Court the opportunity to resolve
the conflict. In Fitzpatrick retired Connecticut employees asserted
that the state's retirement plan discriminated against them on the
basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.150 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted
injunctive relief.151 The court refused, however, to award retroac-
tive benefits or attorney's fees, despite statutory authorization for
both forms of relief.'52 On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that
the eleventh amendment, as construed in Edelman, barred retroac-
tive benefits, 53 but held that the amendment was no bar to an
115 Id. at 667.
146 Id. at 668.
147 Id.
148 See note 139 supra.
149 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
150 427 U.S. at 448. The plaintiffs specifically relied on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
"I Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974). Plaintiffs represented pres-
ent and former male employees of the state of Connecticut. The district court found that
Connecticut's retirement plan discriminated against them on the basis of sex because it
required men to work until age 55 before retirement but allowed women to retire at age
50. In addition, the retirement benefit rates favored women who had worked less than 25
years over men who had worked an equivalent length of time.
152 390 F. Supp. at 288-90. The plaintiffs sought back pay under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (1970). The district court held that Edelman barred this relief because it would
be paid from the state's general fund. 390 F. Supp. at 289.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970) provides:
(k) Attorney's fee; liability of Commission and United States for costs.
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
The court characterized attorney's fees awards as "tantamount to an award of money dam-
ages" (390 F. Supp. at 289), and therefore held that the eleventh amendment barred such
awards. Id.
153 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559, 565-71 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit
found that the suit was "in essence against the state and as such [was] subject to the
Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 565. The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that Con-
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award of attorney's fees if it had "a permissible 'ancillary effect' on
the state treasury."
' 15 4
The Supreme Court held Edelman inapposite because it did
not involve statutory authorization for a monetary award against a
state. 155 In contrast, the awards in Fitzpatrick were specifically au-
thorized by statute. 156 Moreover, this statute had its constitutional
roots in the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. 157
Thus, the Court was forced to decide whether the fourteenth
amendment limited the eleventh.
1 58
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, found that the four-
teenth amendment worked a "shift in the federal-state balance"' 59
because it imposed on states "duties with respect to their treatment
of private individuals' ' 16" and "sanctioned intrusions by Congress
... into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States.' 6' As to the specific relationship
of the eleventh and fourteenth amendments, the Court stated that
necticut had waived its eleventh amendment immunity. Id. at 566-68. Finally, the court
reconciled the eleventh and fourteenth amendments by holding that the eleventh amend-
ment protected states against damage claims by individuals if alternative remedies for four-
teenth amendment violations were available. The court determined that individuals could
sue states under Title VII for injunctive relief (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970)), and that
the federal government, on behalf of individuals, could sue states for back benefits (see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970)). 519 F.2d at 570. The court found that Edelman "reaffirm[ed]
the necessity of maintaining this balance between enforcement of individual constitutional
rights and protection of the state's fiscal administration under the Eleventh." Id.
154 519 F.2d at 571-72 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 668).
155 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976).
156 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), -5(k) (1970); note 152 supra.
157 427 U.S. at 453 n.9. The Court indicated that the parties did not dispute the point
and cited legislative history indicating that Congress intended to invoke its enforcement
power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
158 The Court had never considered the issue, and commentators differed on its prob-
able resolution. Compare Note, supra note 139, at 1898 n.132 ("it may be that in ratifying
the fourteenth amendment the states waived a portion of their immunity under the
eleventh amendment"), with Comment, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 137, at 1206 ("while
the fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause is an important potential source of con-
gressional fee-shifting power, it may be subject to eleventh amendment constraints").
159 427 U.S. at 455 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)). In Virginia, a state
judge challenged his imprisonment for violation of a federal lav prohibiting racial dis-
crimination in the selection of jurors. The Supreme Court held that the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments gave Congress authority to enact the statute even though it ap-
plied to both federal and state judiciaries. The court said § 5 of the fourteenth amendment
"expressly gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the cases em-
braced within the Fourteenth Amendment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending
only to a single class of cases; but within its limits it is complete." Id. at 347-48.
260 427 U.S. at 453.
1 Id. at 455.
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the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment .... Congress
may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, provide for private suits against States or state officials
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. See
Edelman v. Jordan .... 162
As a result, Congress could constitutionally enforce the fourteenth
amendment by authorizing retroactive benefits and attorney's fees
against a state. 163
Because Congress enacted CRAFAA under its fourteenth
amendment power, 1 64 federal courts may award attorney's fees to
AFDC recipients who sue states or state officials under section
1983.165 One district court 66 has already accepted this reading of
Fitzpatrick. Others will surely follow.
C. The Proprietq of Fee Awards to Legal Services Organizations
AFDC recipients usually come to court represented by gov-
ernment-funded or charitable legal services organizations. 167 As a
result, courts will soon have to decide whether or not to award
attorney's fees under CRAFAA to parties who have no obligation
to pay their lawyers. The history168 and policy 169 of the 1976 Act
and cases decided under similar statutes171( suggest an affirmative
answer to this question. Assuming that legal services clients can
16 2 Id. at 456.
163 Courts have yet to decide, however, whether the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment against states extends to ancillary claims. Congress intended the 1976 Act to
authorize fee awards even where a court does not actually enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment, but rests its decision on a pendent claim or an independently cognizable section 1983
claim based on statutory violations. See note 108 and accompanying text supra. The scope
of the fourteenth amendment, however, may not be sufficient to allow congressional in-
tent to overcome the eleventh amendment in this situation. Even if the fourteenth amend-
ment power is not this broad, plaintiffs who prevail against states could argue that attorney's
fees awards are not like damages and thus not prohibited by the eleventh amendment. See
cases cited in note 139 supra. This would put them outside the scope of Edelman.
164 SENATE REPORT, supra note 102, at 5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5913;
122 CONG. REc. H12,160 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
16 See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
166 Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 424 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
6" E.g., Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976);
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974).
16 See note 174 and accompanying text infra.
169 See notes 175-85 and accompanying text infra.
170 See notes 178-81 and accompanying text infra.
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cash in on the 1976 Act, both statutory proscriptions and general
policy may bar government-funded offices from representing par-
ties who can pay attorneys from awards received under the Act.
The Legal Services Corporation (LSG)' 7 a has nonetheless indicated
that the possibility of a fee award should not prevent continued
representation of AFDC plaintiffs by local LSC offices, as long as
the private bar is unwilling to represent AFDC recipients. 172
Although the 1976 Act itself provides no guidance as to
whether courts should award fees to parties benefiting from free
legal representation,1 7 3 the Act's legislative history indicates that
courts should not withhold fees merely because litigants take ad-
vantage of such services.17 4 Moreover, a major policy underlying
the statute supports awarding fees for legal work by these organi-
zations. Congress intended the 1976 Act to encourage private en-
forcement of civil rights.175 Fee awards to parties represented by
organizations that expect no remuneration will promote this pur-
pose. Awards to legal services offices would encourage the filing of
more AFDC suits, prosecuted more quickly and pursued with the
full concentration of office resources. 76 In addition, cases brought
171 Congress created the Legal Services Corporation in 1974 to administer the pro-
gram of federally funded legal services for the poor. Legal Services Corporation Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 2, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961
(Supp. V 1975)).
172 See notes 189-90 and accompanying text infra.
173 The text of the Act is reproduced in note 89 supra.
174 The House Report stated in a footnote: "Similarly, a prevailing party is entitled to
counsel fees even if represented by an organization or if the party is itself an organiza-
tion." HousE REPORT, supra note 102, at 8 n.16. The footnote also cited with approval
three decisions awarding fees to parties represented by charitable and government-funded
organizations: Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974)
(award to legal services organization partially funded by federal grants); Fairley v. Patter-
son, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (award to Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law); Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976)
(award to Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.). In addition, during floor
discussion on the bill, Senator Helms argued the bill was unnecessary to insure the protec-
tion of indigents' rights, because the indigent can obtain free legal assistance. 122 CONG.
REC. S16,433 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Helms). Nevertheless, the bill
passed without distinguishing between parties who paid their lawyers and parties who
did not.
175 See notes 102-06 and accompanying text supra.
176 Commentators agree that the Legal Services Corporation needs additional funds to
accomplish its stated objectives. See, e.g., Cramton, The Corporation Speaks: Chairnan Cram-
ton, President Ehrlich Greet NLADA, 33 NLADA BRIEFCASE 42, 44-45 (1976); Cramton, The
Task Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A.J. 1339, 1340-41 (1975); Drinan, Reflections on the
Struggle, 33 NLADA BRIEFCASE 51, 55-56 (1976). The LSC has been forced to set undesir-
ably low financial eligibility standards for clients (see 41 Fed. Reg. 51604 (1976) (regulation
to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1611)). Since the LSC and local offices may accept funds from
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by legal aid offices may draw the attention of private attorneys.
The private bar may become more interested in AFDC litigation as
legal services attorneys expand the body of substantive AFDC
precedent and as accompanying fee awards become more com-
monplace. 7'
A number of courts have recognized that awarding fees to
plaintiffs represented by government-funded and charitable le-
gal services offices encourages the private enforcement of legal
rights. 1 78 Even courts denying fees to legal aid offices have recog-
nized that granting the award would have promoted this policy as
much as an award to a private attorney's client.'7 9 Since the 1976
Act is intended to promote private enforcement,8 " these cases in-
dicate that courts should award fees under the Act without regard
to the prevailing party's obligation to pay his attorney. 18'
On the other side of the coin, Congress hoped the 1976 Act
would deter frivolous litigation.' 82 To accomplish this purpose,
sources other than the government (42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e(a)(2), 2996i(c) (Supp. V 1975); 45
C.F.R. § 1609.5 (1976)), the possibility of a fee award could encourage a local office to
pursue AFDC recipients' § 1983 actions. Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices,
87 HARv. L. REv. 411, 413-17 (1973).
17 See McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 765; Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest
Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301, 331-32 (1973); Note, supra note 176, at 414.
178See, e.g., Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 11-14 (2d Cir. 1976); Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Rec. Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1146-48 (4th Cir. 1975); Hairston v. R & R Aptmts., 510
F.2d 1090, 1091-93 (7th Cir. 1975); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507
F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir.
1974); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 536-37 (5th Cir. 1970).
179 In Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (lst Cir. 1974), the court awarded fees under the
private attorney general exception to a private attorney who represented prisoners but
denied fees to the co-counsel legal services office, because the award to the private attorney
would adequately encourage private enforcement. If there had been no private attorney
involved, the court indicated that it would have awarded a fee to the legal services office.
Id. at 221. One federal judge denied a legal aid society's request for fees under the bad
faith exception, although he agreed the defendant showed bad faith. Woolfolk v. Brown,
358 F. Supp. 524, 535-37 (E.D. Va. 1973). In a different case two days later, he awarded
the legal aid society fees under a statute, because the congressional purpose of encouraging
private enforcement of the statute was more important than the problems raised by a fee
award to a government-funded office. Jones v. Seldon's Furniture Warehouse, Inc., 357 F.
Supp. 886 (E.D. Va. 1973).
1 8 See notes 102-06 and accompanying text supra.
181 Courts have also held that the measurement of the fee should not vary simply
because the recipient is a government-funded or charitable organization. E.g., Torres v.
Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 11-14 (2d Cir. 1976); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Rec. Ass'n, 517 F.2d
1141, 1148 (4th Cir. 1975); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1974). See
Note, supra note 176, at 412 n.8. But see Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (lst
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
182 See notes 117-22 and accompanying text supra.
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courts may assess fees against plaintiffs who act in bad faith.' 83
Similarly, the LSC is statutorily liable for defendants' attorney's
fees if a local office represents a plaintiff who has sued solely for
"harassment" or has "maliciously abused legal process."', 84 Thus, by
awarding fees to successful defendants under appropriate circum-
stances, courts can further the deterrence policy of the 1976 Act.' 85
Even if courts decide to award fees to prevailing legal services
organizations, LSC regulations arguably prohibit local offices from
continuing to accept cases subject to the 1976 Act. To "insure that
[it does] not compete with private attorneys,"' 86 a local office may
not accept a "fee-generiting case."' 87 Nevertheless, the purpose of
the 1976 Act of encouraging private enforcement can be effected
only if plaintiffs can find lawyers to assist them. Despite the possi-
bility of fee awards, private attorneys may remain uninterested in
AFDC cases. The area is complex, and private practitioners may
find themselves unable to correctly assess their prospects in par-
ticular cases. 188 If private attorneys therefore refuse to take AFDC
cases, the local LSC-funded office will continue to represent AFDC
recipients 89 in section 1983 actions under exceptions to the "fee-
generating case" prohibition. 90 If the private bar becomes inter-
183 See id.
184 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(f) (Supp. V 1975). See CONF. REP. No. 93-247, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3897, 3904.
"'See Note, supra note 176, at 417-20 (pointing out also that the award or threat of
one promotes settlement).
186 45 C.F.R. § 1609.1 (1976).
187 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3 (1976). The text of this section is set out in note 190 infra. 45
C.F.R. § 1609.2 (1976) provides:
"Fee-generating case" means any case or matter which, if undertaken on be-
half of an eligible client by an attorney in private practice, reasonably may be
expected to result in a fee for legal services from an award to a client, from public
funds, or from the opposing party.
8
' See 41 Fed. Reg. 51,604-05 (1976) (Comment accompanying eligibility regulations).
189 AFDC recipients will usually meet the financial eligibility criteria. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996a(3) (Supp. V 1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 51,604 (1976) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1611).
191 45 C.F.R. § 1609 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
§ 1609.3 Prohibition.
No recipient shall use funds received from the Corporation to provide legal
assistance in a fee-generating case unless other adequate representation is unavail-
able. All recipients shall establish procedures for the referral of fee-generating
cases.
§ 1609.4 Authorized representation in a fee-generating case.
Other adequate representation is deemed to be unavailable when (a) The re-
cipient has determined that free referral is not possible because:
(1) The case has been rejected by the local lawyer referral service, or by two
private attorneys; or
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ested in AFDC-1983 cases, however, LSC-funded offices will have
to turn AFDC recipients away. 191 Thus, the LSC-funded legal ser-
vices organizations may find themselves representing clients with
only the most marginal claims. But whoever ultimately dominates
in representing AFDC litigants, the purposes of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 will be fostered to the benefit
of AFDC recipients.
III
REMEDIES FOR UNLAWFUL DISCLOSURE OF
CONFIDENTIAL AFDC FILES
In the late 1960s, critics of welfare programs expressed con-
cern about the growing invasion of recipients' privacy. Criticism
focused both on the wealth of information accumulated and on the
methods employed to acquire that information.' 92 More recently,
however, Congress and the courts have shown less concern for
recipient privacy, authorizing intrusions that would have provoked
vehement dissent a few years ago.' 93 The present scheme of fed-
eral welfare statutes does retain some protection of privacy in 42
(2) Neither the referral service nor any lawyer will consider the case without
payment of a consultation fee; or
(3) The case is of the type that private attorneys in the area ordinarily do not
accept, or do not accept without prepayment of a fee; or
(4) Emergency circumstances compel immediate action before referral can be
made, but the client is advised that, if appropriate, and consistent with profes-
sional responsibility, referral will be attempted at a later time; or
(b) Recovery of damages is not the principal object of the case and a request
for damages is merely ancillary to an action for equitable or other non-pecuniary
relief; or inclusion of a counterclaim requesting damages is necessary for effective
defense or because of applicable rules governing joinder of counterclaims; or
(c) A court appoints a recipient or an employee of a recipient pursuant to a
statute or a court rule or practice of equal applicability to all attorneys in the
jurisdiction.
191 Exceptions allowing LSC-funded offices to handle the fee-generating cases would
no longer apply. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1609.3-.4 (1976), set out in note 190 supra.
192 E.g., Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill.) (eligibility requirement that unwed
mother identify child's father violates Social Security Act), aff'd mem. sub nom. Weaver v.
Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223
(1967) (welfare eligibility may not be conditioned on consent to midnight raids conducted
without a search warrant). See Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72
YALE L.J. 1347 (1963); Wickham, Restricting Home Visits: Toward Making the Life of the Public
Assistance Recipient Less Public, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1970).
'" See Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730 (1975) (per curiam) (since congressional action
required AFDC recipients to cooperate in paternity and support proceedings, Court did
not consider district court ruling that requirement violated Social Security Act); Act of Jan.
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U.S.C. § 602(a)(9), 194 which requires states to maintain the confi-
dentiality of recipients' files. Two 1976 decisions, however, indicate
that even this protection may be deteriorating.
In Morris v. Danna'95 and Pajewski v. Perry, 96 state welfare
officials released embarrassing information from welfare files to
local news media. The welfare recipients sued the state officials for
damages. These suits presented a novel issue in welfare law, for the
remedies available to welfare recipients are generally limited to
prospective injunctive relief compelling states to comply with the
4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2351, as amended, Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-88, tit. 2, 89 Stat. 433 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (established
Parent Locator Service to use federal files to help states and private persons locate absent
parents). See also Piven & Cloward, Eroding Welfare Rights, Civ. LIB. REV., Winter/Spring
1974, at 41 (arguing that ligitation has more impact in times of unrest and that present
calm has resulted in less favorable decisions in welfare cases). Compare Wickham, supra note
192 (arguing that conditioning AFDC eligibility on consent to home visits violates fourth
amendment and right to privacy), with Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding
home visits as condition to AFDC eligibility).
194 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must . . . (9)
provide safeguards which restrict the use of [sic] disclosure of information con-
cerning applicants or recipients to purposes directly connected with (A) the ad-
ministration of the plan of the State approved under this part, the plan or pro-
gram of the State under part B, C, or D of this subchapter or under subchapter I,
X, XIV, XVI, XIX, or XX of this chapter, or the supplemental security income
program established by subchapter XVI of this chapter, (B) any investigation, pros-
ecution, or criminal or civil proceeding, conducted in connection with the ad-
ministration of any such plan or program, and (C) the administration of any other
Federal or federally assisted program which provides assistance, in cash or in
kind, or services, directly to individuals on the basis of need; and the safeguards
so provided shall prohibit disclosure, to any committee or a legislative body, of
any information which identifies by name or address any such applicant or recip-
ient ....
The protection of this section is not as complete as may first appear. In the Revenue Act
of 1951, Congress included a little-known and still-uncodified amendment-the Jenner
Amendment. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 183, c. 521, tit. VI, § 618, 65 Stat. 452.
This amendment allows states to provide public access to records of individual AFDC dis-
bursements as long as the records are not used for commercial or political purposes. De-
spite subsequent amendments to § 602(a)(9) (Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647,
§ 101(c)(2), 88 Stat. 2351; Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-88, tit. 2, § 207, 89 Stat.
433) accompanied by legislative history that indicates ignorance of the Jenner Amendment
(see S. REP. No. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 8133, 8152), HEW disclosure regulations continue to allow states to provide this
limited public access. 45 C.F.R. § 205.50(e) (1976). Even if the Jenner Amendment has
retained its vitality, however, § 602(a)(9) would still protect AFDC recipients from embar-
rassing disclosures since the amendment allows the public to know only the amount of
individual disbursements-not personal information. In addition, newspaper or magazine
publication is at least arguably a commercial purpose.
195 411 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977).
196 363 A.2d 429 (Del. 1976).
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Social Security Act.197 More specifically, section 602(a)(9) has never
been the basis of compensatory relief; rather, recipients or welfare
departments usually invoke the section, or state rules enacted to
comply with it, to prevent prospective disclosure of AFDC files in
unrelated proceedings. 19 8 In Morris, a federal court held that it had
no jurisdiction to hear a defamed recipient's damage suit because
the state's own confidentiality regulations transformed the claim
into an issue of state law. 199 Four months later, the Delaware Su-
preme Court held in Pajewski that sovereign immunity bars recov-
ery on such a claim in state court unless the state legislature, or its
administrative delegate, has specifically waived immunity for de-
famation.2 1°0 Thus, a welfare recipient defamed by the very disclo-
sures required for eligibility under a federal statute faces the
Catch-22 of federalism. In federal court, state remedies are exclu-
sive; in state court, federal protections are unrecognized. This sec-
tion will propose several theories under which both state and fed-
eral courts might avoid these present obstacles to relief.
A. Morris v. Danna: A Federal Court Ducks the Issue
In Morris, newspaper stories about the successes of a local wel-
fare fraud unit mentioned Morris, the plaintiff AFDC recipient, by
name and reported sensitive information from the medical history
in his welfare file.201 Morris sought declaratory, injunctive, and
monetary relief, alleging that local welfare officials had violated
federal20 2 and state 20 3 statutes and regulations protecting the con-
197 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
19 See, e.g., Mace v. Jung, 386 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1963) (error to admit evidence ob-
tained from examination of plaintiff's welfare file in tort action); In re Cager, 251 Md. 473,
248 A.2d 384 (1967) (recipients challenge use of records in neglect proceedings); Paine v.
Chick, 50 App. Div. 2d 686, 375 N.Y.S.2d 198 (3d Dep't 1975) (trial court properly ordered
limited production of plaintiff's welfare records in tort action); McMullan v. Wohlgemuth,
453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973) (state opposing newspaper's suit for access to welfare files),
appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 970 (1974); State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169
P.2d 706 (1946) (juvenile court may order welfare records produced at confidential pro-
ceedings).
199 411 F. Supp. at 1305-09.
200 363 A.2d at 430-36.
201 411 F. Supp. at 1301.
202 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975). The text of the statute is set out in note 194
supra. The applicable federal regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 205.50 (1976), requires that state
welfare plans forbid disclosures of the type allegedly committed in Morris.
213 Minnesota welfare statutes do not specifically protect the confidentiality of records
but give the state commissioner power to promulgate regulations to qualify the state for
federal grants. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.011(1) (West Supp. 1976). MINN. RuL. DPW 45
prohibits disclosure of the contents of recipients' files except for program administration
purposes or for the administration of services that the recipient has requested from an-
other agency. 10 MINN. STATE REGS. 116 (1976). The plaintiff also relied on two sections of
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fidentiality of his AFDC records. 204 In a decision subsequently
adopted by the Eighth Circuit,20 5 the district court ruled that it had
neither federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1206 nor
equal rights jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.207
The court assumed arguendo that the plaintiff met the
$10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for federal question
jurisdiction. 208 Rather, the plaintiff's problem lay in stating a claim
"aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."20 9 The district court had little difficulty deciding that the
disclosures involved did not encroach upon a privacy right of con-
stitutional significance. 210 Only very subtle reasoning, however, al-
the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, which provide:
"Confidential data on individuals" means data which is: (a) made not public
by statute or federal law applicable to the data and is inaccessible to the individual
subject of that data; or (b) collected by a civil or criminal investigative agency as
part of an active investigation undertaken for the purpose of the commencement
of a legal action, provided that the burden of proof as to whether such investiga-
tion is active or in anticipation of a legal action is upon the agency.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.162(2a) (West 1977).
Private or confidential data on individuals shall not be used, collected, stored
or disseminated for any purposes other than those stated to an individual at the
time of collection in accordance with section 15.165 or, in the case of data col-
lected prior to August 1, 1975, for any purpose other than those originally au-
thorized by law, unless (1) the responsible authority files a statement with the
commissioner describing the purposes and necessity of the purpose with regard to
the health, safety or welfare of the public and the purpose is approved by the
commissioner, or (2) the purpose is subsequently authorized by the state or fed-
eral legislature, or (3) the purpose is one to which the individual subject or sub-
jects of the data have given their informed consent.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.1641(c) (West 1977).
204 411 F. Supp. at 1301-02.
205 The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the basis of the district court's opinion. Morris v.
Danna, 547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'g per curiam 411 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Minn. 1976).
The discussion in the text therefore focuses on the lower court's reasoning.
206 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) (amended 1976). The current version of this section is
set out in note 12 supra.
207 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). The text of the applicable subsections is set out in note 26
supra.
2" 411 F. Supp. at 1303. Plaintiff alleged damage to his reputation in the amount of
$75,000. Id.
209 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) (amended 1976). The current version of this section is
set out in note 12 supra.
210 411 F. Supp. at 1303-05. The court determined that the privacy right protected by
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), did not extend to all aspects of common-law
privacy. Griswold concerned the right to be free from "intrusion upon the plaintiff's sol-
itude or seclusion ...." 411 F. Supp. at 1303 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 807 (4th ed. 1971)). Morris' complaint, however, closely resembled
an entirely different tort described by Prosser as "publicity, of a highly objectionable kind,
given to private information about the plaintiff, even though it is true and no action would
lie for defamation." Id. at 809. The district court stated that prior decisions of the Eighth
Circuit had determined that even actual defamation by state officials did not impugn a
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lowed the court to find that plaintiff's claim did not "arise under"
the Social Security Act. The court acknowledged that the Act re-
quired the state to "provide safeguards which restrict the use [or]
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients."21'
The State of Minnesota, however, had fully met this requirement
by promulgating regulations governing confidentiality.2 12 Under
the rationale of Miller's Executors v. Swann,21 3 an 1893 Supreme
Court decision, plaintiff's claim raised only the issue of compliance
with state law-despite the origin of that law in federal statutory
requirements.
Plaintiff's pleadings made this judicial legerdemain possible.
As the court read the complaint, plaintiff "allege[d] in effect that
the plan adopted by the State of Minnesota has complied with
§ 602(a)(9)." 21 4 Had plaintiff alleged that unenforced state regula-
constitutionally protected privacy right. 411 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing Ellingburg v. Lucas,
518 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)). Therefore, plaintiff's allegation of quasi-
defamation by the state could not possibly amount to a constitutional tort.
The court declined to follow a contrary notion expressed by Justice Douglas in Do v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas indicated that
congressional publication of derogatory information about school children violated their
constitutional rights. Id. at 325. Commentators who have considered the problem of wel-
fare recipients' privacy have urged expansion of the constitutional tort concept. One writer
has argued that courts should bar intrusions into the privacy of the family relationship.
Such protection would promote "the three vital social interests traditionally associated with
an autonomous child-based unit: social stability, individual liberty and child weifare." Pou-
lin, Illegitimacy and Family Privacy: A Note on Maternal Cooperation in Paternity Suits, 70 Nw.
U.L. REv. 910, 914 (1976). Others have defined privacy more broadly. More than simple
freedom from intrusion, privacy includes the freedom to control the information that
others have about us. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Wickham, supra note 192.
Although these arguments were originally offered to support restrictions on the informa-
tion welfare administrators can initially obtain about recipients, they are equally applicable
to restrictions on the subsequent disclosure of information.
211 411 F. Supp. at 1305 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975)).
212 See note 203 supra.
213 150 U.S. 132 (1893). The case involved a land dispute between Alabama and a
private party, arising out of a railroad bankruptcy. The state had obtained land under a
federal statute and conveyed it by statute to the railroad, retaining a mortgage that in-
cluded conditions required by the federal act. The railroad in turn conveyed the land to
the private party in the case. The Alabama Supreme Court found the railroad had not
complied with the mortgage terms imposed by the federal act and awarded title to the
state. The United States Supreme Court declined to review the decision:
The fact that the state statute and the mortgage refer to certain acts of Congress
as prescribing the rule and measure of the rights granted by the State, does not
make the determination of such rights a Federal question .... The inquiry along
Federal lines is only incidental to a determination of the local question of what the
State has required and prescribed.
Id. at 136-37 (emphasis added).
214 411 F. Supp. at 1305. Since the court could read the complaint to admit com-
pliance with federal standards, the Social Security Act was not "an essential element of
plaintiff's cause of action." I J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 0.60[8.-3], at 630 (2d
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tions did not "provide safeguards,' 215 as required by the federal Act,
his claim would arguably have "arisen under" a federal statute.216
This view gains support from the many cases finding federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over noncompliance suits involving unwritten
regulations or state practices that violate Social Security Act pro-
visions. 217 Nevertheless, the Morris court indicated that a federal
question arises only "when conflicts between state and federal laws
exist."21 8
Having found the plaintiff's claim to lie outside of section
1331, the court then considered whether it had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1343.219 Subsection 1343(3), however, could not consti-
tute a basis for federal jurisdiction since neither the Social Security
Act generally2211 nor section 602(a)(9) standing alone 221 is a statute
"providing for equal rights of citizens. 222 The court also rejected
ed. 1976) (footnote omitted). Nor did plaintiff's claim meet the test proposed by Professor
Mishkin and approved by Wright, Miller and Cooper: "a substantial claim founded 'di-
rectly' upon federal law." C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER and E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3562, at 414 (1975). See also Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 115-16
(1936) (where right to be enforced is created by state, it is unimportant that state authority
stems from federal consent).
215 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
218 The importance of the manner in which plaintiff framed his complaint appears
from the following excerpts from the court's opinion:
To paraphrase the Court in [Miller's Executors v. Swann], the question is not what
rights and duties passed to the State under the Federal act-since the plaintiff
alleges that the State has already complied with such duties-but what duties the
defendants had under the laws of the State. "The inquiry along federal lines is
only incidental to a determination of the local question of what the state has required
and prescribed."
As one commentator has stated in analyzing the welfare statutes, "Federal court
jurisdiction can be invoked only when conflicts between state and federal laws
exist." . . . The allegations of the complaint demonstrate that there is no such
conflict here, and the case does not "arise under" a law of the United States.
411 F. Supp. at 1306-07 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
217E.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 583 (1975) (practice of denying AFDC benefits to
pregnant women); Lund v. Affleck, 388 F. Supp. 137 (1975) (practice of denying benefits
to minor unwed mothers).
218 411 F. Supp. at 1307 (quoting Herzer, supra note 44, at 11).
219 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). The text of the applicable subsections is set out in note 26
supra.
220 411 F. Supp. at 1308 (citing Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1082 n.9 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Aguayo v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 462, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1146 (1974)).
221 411 F. Supp. at 1308 (citing McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1951)
(wiretap provisions of Federal Communications Act of 1934 do not protect equal rights)).
222 411 F. Supp. at 1308 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)). See notes 45-56 and
accompanying text supra.
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the plaintiff's claim for relief under subsection 1343(4), because he
was not seeking relief "under" a federal statute.223
The narrow reading of federal question jurisdiction in Morris
is not unique. 22 4 Nevertheless, federal interest in proper adminis-
tration of AFDC programs arguably outweighs the desire to keep
state-law squabbles out of federal court.225 Indeed, the expansion
of pendent federal jurisdiction over AFDC claims in Hagans v.
Lavine2 6 draws the narrow views of Morris into serious question. 227
If the underlying rationale of Morris is a desire to avoid the indeli-
cacy of awarding substantial damages to an AFDC recipient im-
plicated in welfare fraud, a federal court need only look to the
eleventh amendment and Edelman v. Jordan228 to find full protec-
tion for the state's coffers. Only the individual state official guilty
of defamation2 2 9 could be called upon to pay money damages
-hardly a deep pocket. Yet Morris denied even prospective injunc-
tive relief,231 thus leaving to the state the enforcement of the pro-
tections that Congress required in section 602(a)(9). A recent
Delaware decision 23 1 aptly illustrates the dangers inherent in rele-
gating federal confidentiality rules to the vagaries of state courts.
B. Pajewski v. Perry: A State Court Ducks the Issue
In Pajewski v. Perry', 2332 the Delaware Supreme Court limited a
recipient's right to enforce the confidentiality of his AFDC records
and to obtain a remedy for their illegal disclosure. The plaintiffs
complained that a magazine article publicized family history drawn
from their welfare file without concealing their identity. Welfare
223 411 F. Supp. at 1308. See notes 64-77, 208-18, and accompanying text supra.
224 See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936) (narrowly construing "aris-
ing under" in a different context). Decided four months after Morris, Reyes v. Edmunds,
416 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn. 1976), followed the same reading of § 1331.
225 See note 44 supra.
226 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
2127 See notes 29-36 and accompanying text supra.
228 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See notes 136-47 and accompanying text supra. Absent a fed-
eral statute rooted in the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, the eleventh
amendment bars a federal court from awarding damages to an individual in a suit against
a state. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
229 See Note, Suing State Welfare Officials for Damages in Federal Court: The Eleventh
Amendment and Qualified Immunity, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 105, 123-25 (1976) (arguing ret-
roactive benefits may be available from state welfare officials acting in bad faith or un-
reasonably). Of course, a federal court might not even assume jurisdiction over a pendent
claim against an individual. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
220 411 F. Supp. at 1307.
231 Pajewski v. Perry, 363 A.2d 429 (Del. 1976).
2 3 2 Id.
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department personnel also disclosed the information at a semi-
nar.233 The recipients sued the state for damages both in tort and
in contract.
The tort claim, charging state welfare officials with libel and
invasion of privacy, faced the barrier of sovereign immunity. Al-
though the doctrine has lost some vitality as government activity
has expanded 23 4-a trend the Delaware court noted with approv-
alZ35-sovereign immunity is not dead. 236 The court pointed out
that 1969 Delaware legislation 237 "create[d] what appears to be a
comprehensive insurance program with implementing administra-
tive provisions. '2 38 The statute waived the immunity defense
against any insured risk.239 After much struggle with the language
of the insurance act, however, the court was unable to decide
whether the state had waived its immunity to the Pajewski claim
because the state had yet to purchase any insurance. 2411 It re-
manded for a determination of whether or not the committee re-
sponsible for buying insurance had decided to insure against this
particular risk. 2
41
Although the Pajewski tort claim survived to spend another
round in the trial court, the difficulty encountered by the Delaware
Supreme Court in deciding the sovereign immunity issue exem-
plifies the obstacles facing many plaintiffs alleging libel and inva-
sion of privacy against a state. In only a few jurisdictions has
sovereign immunity been totally abolished by judicial fiat.242 In
others, like Delaware, legislative waiver is on a piecemeal basis,
generally including only the more common physical risks incurred
233 Id. at 430.
23"4 See, e.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961) (tort immunity "discarded"); Willis v. Department of Conservation and Eco-
nomic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970) (tort immunity limited to governmental func-
tions); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 54, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (tort im-
munity "abolished"). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 984-87
(4th ed. 1971).
235 363 A.2d at 434 & n.3.
2" See, e.g., Bale v. Ryder, 286 A.2d 344 (Me. 1972) (deferring to the legislature to
abrogate immunity); O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.) (only legislature can
abrogate tort immunity completely), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
237 DEL. CODE tit. 18, §§ 6501-6543 (1974).
238 363 A.2d at 435.239 Id. at 432. See DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6511 (1974).
240 363 A.2d at 432-33.
241 Id. at 436-37.
242 For a recent state-by-state discussion of the status of sovereign immunity, see Har-
ley & Wasinger, Governmental Immunity: Despotic Mantle or Creature of Necessity, 16 WASHBURN
L.J. 12, 33-53 app. (1976).
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in the operation of government services. 243 Thus, AFDC recipients
face a difficult, if not impassable, road in asserting privacy claims
against loose-lipped caseworkers.
In their contract count, plaintiffs alleged that the disclosure
breached the federal-state contract to provide AFDC benefits in
Delaware. They asserted a right of action under this contract as
intended third-party beneficiaries.244 The state of Delaware, ar-
gued the plaintiffs, promised the federal government that it would
comply with the subsection 602(a)(9) limitations on disclosure when
it accepted federal AFDC funds.245  Although recognizing that
"Delaware may have a contractual duty to the Federal Govern-
ment to preserve confidentiality, 2 46 the court denied the plaintiffs'
request for damages resulting from breach.247
The court began its cursory treatment of this question by dis-
tinguishing an earlier case 248 in which it had recognized a cause of
action by a federal prisoner against the state for breach of a state-
federal contract governing his incarceration. The court reasoned
that the federal government owed the federal prisoner a "statutory
duty of 'safekeeping' and 'protection,' "249 a duty that Delaware
had contracted to perform, but that in Pajewski "[n]either the rec-
ord nor the briefs show[ed] any duty owed by the United States to
plaintiffs which the State ha[d] undertaken to perform.''25" In ad-
dition, the plaintiffs failed to qualfiy as intended beneficiaries
under section 145 of the Restatement of Contracts25' because "noth-
ing in the alleged contract nor in the surrounding circumstances
243 See id.
244 363 A.2d at 430. In the language of the Restatement, third-party beneficiaries are
either "intended" or "incidental." Only the former may sue the promisor for breach. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
245 363 A.2d at 430-31.
246 Id. at 431. Because the federal government does not compel states to participate in
AFDC, there is a strong argument that the obligation to maintain the confidentiality of
records is contractual and not statutory. Only after a state decides to participate in the
AFDC program and accept federal funds does it assume the obligation to comply with the
Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 & 604 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). AFDC may be an
"offer a state cannot refuse," but it is, nevertheless, an offer. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 408 (1970).
217 363 A.2d at 432.
248 Blair v. Anderson, 325 A.2d 94 (Del. 1974).
249 363 A.2d at 431.25 0 Id.
251 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 145 (1932) provides:
A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or municipality by con-
tract to do an act or render a service to some or all of the members of the public,
is subject to no duty under the contract to such members to give compensation for
[Vol. 62:10501084
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. . . manifest[ed] an intention to give plaintiffs a right to sue the
State on the grounds ... alleged. 252
Pajewski v. Perry reflects a misunderstanding of the Social Se-
curity Act, Supreme Court decisions interpreting it, and modern
developments in third-party beneficiary law. In Weinberger v. New
York Stock Exchange,253 the Southern District of New York applied
section 145 to a contract between the United States and a quasi-
governmental body-the New York Stock Exchange. 254 In deciding
whether the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the contract,
the court looked to two sources: the statute requiring the contract
and judicial interpretations of the statute.255 The AFDC portion of
the Social Security Act is intended to "encourag[e] the care of de-
pendent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives
... [and] to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help
such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the max-
imum self-support and personal independence consistent with the
maintenance of continuing parental care and protection .... 256
Subsection 602(a)(9) in particular requires states to "provide safe-
guards which restrict the use of [sic] disclosure of information con-
the injurious consequences of performing or attempting to perform it, or of fail-
ing to do so, unless,
(a) an intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light of
the circumstances surrounding its formation, that the promisor shall com-
pensate members of the public for such injurious consequences, or
(b) the promisor's contract is with a municipality to render services the non-
performance of which would subject the municipality to a duty to pay
damages to those injured thereby.
252 363 A.2d at 431.
253 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). To come within the longer statute of limitations
for contract claims, Weinberger asserted that he was the intended third-party beneficiary
of the contract between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York Stock
Exchange. As required by statute, the Exchange agreed to enforce the securities laws
against its members. Weinberger had invested in a member firm that had allegedly violated
securities laws before going bankrupt. Id. at 140.
2.4 Weinberger is analogous to AFDC defamation claims in at least three ways. First, the
Exchange's promise to enforce the securities laws was a statutory consequence of its deci-
sion to register as a national exchange, much as a state's obligation to comply with the
Social Security Act arises by statute from acceptance of AFDC funds. Second, the Wein-
berger contract protected investors from violations of the securities laws just as a state's
agreement to comply with the Social Security Act protects recipients against violations of
subsection 602(a)(9). The Exchange enforces the securities laws against its members, and
the state enforces subsection 602(a)(9) against welfare employees. Finally, as an enforcer of
the securities laws whose rules have been given the force of law, the Exchange resembles a
governmental body like a state.
255 335 F. Supp. at 143-44.
256 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
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cerning applicants or recipients .... *257 This language evinces a
purpose to protect recipients. Moreover, the legislative history of
the initial enactment and subsequent amendments of subsection
602(a)(9) support this reading.258
Judicial construction of the statute also illuminates the gov-
ernment-promisee's intention to benefit third parties. At least
three state courts259 have found that subsection 602(a)(9) or state
rules passed to comply with it are intended to protect AFDC recip-
ients as a group. In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled on
several occasions that individual AFDC recipients can challenge
any state rule or practice that denies them benefits if the rule or
practice is inconsistent with the Social Security Act. 26" The logical
inference from these holdings is that the Supreme Court believes
that the requirements of the Social Security Act were intended to
benefit recipients and to give them a personal right of action for
deprivation of those benefits. Thus the words and history of sub-
section 602(a)(9) and judicial interpretations of its meaning make a
recipient, in the language of the Weinberger court, "more than an
incidental beneficiary of the contract mandated by an Act of Con-
gress. [They give] him an independent claim for relief.' '261
No less important than the foregoing statutory analysis is the
new formulation of third-party beneficiary law embodied in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.262 The revised section 145 suggests
257 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975).
258 Both the Senate and House committee reports accompanying the original enact-
ment stated that its "obvious purpose [was] to insure efficient administration and to pro-
tect recipients from humiliation and exploitation." S. REP. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 (1939); H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1939). Although Congress amended
the section in 1974 to grant access to the files to persons searching for absent parents, the
Senate committee report reiterated that the original purpose was "to prevent harassment
of welfare recipients." S. REP. No. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 8133, 8152.
2 9 In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 482-83, 248 A.2d 384, 389-90 (1968); Paine v. Chick, 50
App. Div. 2d 686, 687, 375 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (3d Dep't 1975); McMullan v. Wohlgemuth,
453 Pa. 147, 164-65, 308 A.2d 888, 897 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 970 (1974). Cf.
Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300, 1307 (D. Minn. 1976) (dicta recognizing that "Congress
did wish to assure that welfare files were in fact kept confidential" and referring to "the right
of confidentiality"), aff'd per curian, 547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977).
260 Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600-01 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S.
282, 285-86 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968). See note 11 supra.
261 Weinberger v. New York Stock Exchange, 335 F. Supp. 139, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
262 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 145 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967) provides:
(1) The rules stated in this Chapter apply to contracts with a government or gov-
ernmental agency except to the extent that application would contravene the pol-
icy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing remedies for its breach.
1086 [Vol. 62:1050
DEVELOPMENTS IN WELFARE LAW
two theories supporting the position that individual AFDC recip-
ients are intended beneficiaries of confidentiality rules. First, ap-
plying subsection 145(2)(a), the state would be liable if "the terms
of the promise provide for such liability. '263 This promise need not
be explicit; "[i]f there is no explicit promise, . . . the question
whether a particular claimant is an intended beneficiary is one of
interpretation, depending on all the circumstances of the con-
tract. '264 Each year states voluntarily accept federal funds with
notice of the terms, legislative history, and judicial construction of
the Social Security Act. As previously demonstrated,2 6 5 these "cir-
cumstances of the contract" reveal an intention to benefit the
group of people whom the states deem financially eligible for
AFDC benefits. 266 More importantly, individual members of this
group can point to a history of suits in which they were allowed to
enforce the contractual obligation between the state and federal
governments. 267 At least impliedly, "the terms of the promise pro-
vide for [state] liability. 268
(2) In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or governmental
agency to do an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to contractual
liability to a member of the public for consequential damages resulting from perfor-
mance or failure to perform unless
(a) the terms of'the promise provide for such liability; or
(b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the
damages and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms
of the contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract and
prescribing remedies for its breach.
26 3 1d. § 145(2)(a).
26 4 Id. § 145, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
25 See notes 256-61 and accompanying text supra.
266 In the public housing area, tenants and persons displaced by urban redevelopment
have standing to enforce federal standards against local housing agencies that receive fed-
eral funds. Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932-37 (2d Cir. 1968); Western Addition Com-
munity Org. v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433, 443-45 (N.D. Cal. 1968). But see Boston Pub.
Housing Tenants' Policy Council, Inc. v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 493, 495-96 (D. Mass. 1974).
The federal government disburses redevelopment funds* under contracts that require com-
pliance with certain standards. Generally, courts find a congressional intention to protect
the plaintiffs and hold that tenants have rights as third-party beneficiaries. Admittedly,
these cases involve an explicit contract, unlike the AFDC arrangement. The Pajewski court,
however, thought the State had a contractual obligation to the federal government, despite
the lack of a separate writing. The public housing contract analogue is therefore apposite.
For decisions where courts found intended beneficiaries of government contracts in other
contexts, see Hebah v. United States, 428 F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (individual Indian in-
tended beneficiary of treaty between tribe and federal government); Bartashevich v. City
of Portland, 308 A.2d 551 (Me. 1973) (injured citizen intended beneficiary of employment
contract between city and policeman).
167 See cases cited in note 260 supra.
26s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 145(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
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AFDC recipients can also qualify as intended beneficiaries of
the state-federal AFDC contract under the second test stated in the
tentative draft of the Restatement. If the federal government "is
subject to liability to the [AFDC recipient] for the damages and a
direct action against the [state] is consistent with the terms of the
contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract,"269
the recipient has a right of action as an intended beneficiary. Thus,
the first question under subsection 145(2)(b) is whether the federal
government may be liable for damages to an AFDC recipient. By
enacting section 602(a)(9), the federal government arguably as-
sumed a duty to enforce the confidentiality requirements against
the states. Negligence in that enforcement could subject the federal
government to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act 71 if it
results in disclosures damaging to an AFDC recipient. Courts have
held the federal government liable to members of the public under
this statute in a number of different contexts in which the govern-
ment has assumed some obligation. 27' These courts have reasoned
that "if the Government undertakes to perform certain acts or
functions thus engendering reliance thereon, it must perform
them with due care. ' 272 Further, "that obligation of due care ex-
tends to the public and the individuals who compose it.' '273 This
analysis is easily applied in the AFDC context. Since the federal
government has undertaken to protect AFDC recipients from dis-
closure of their records,274 and recipients rely on this protection
when divulging personal information, the federal government may
be liable to the recipients if it negligently performs its duty.
The second question raised by subsection 145(2)(b)-whether
policy supports a direct action against the state promisor-is an-
swered by the Supreme Court's rulings that AFDC recipients them-
selves can compel states to comply with the Social Security Act.275
2691d. § 145(2)(b).
270 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1970).
271 See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (government liable
for negligent operation of lighthouse); Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956)
(government liable for negligent release of patient from psychiatric care); Union Trust Co.
v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953) (government liable for negligent control of
air traffic), aff'd sub nom. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
272 Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1956).
273 Id.
274 The legislative history of subsection 602(a)(9) demonstrates that Congress in-
tended it to protect recipients. See note 258 supra.
275 See cases cited in note 260 supra.
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If AFDC recipients can bring direct actions seeking injunctive re-
lief when states breach the AFDC contract, they should likewise be
able to recover directly for injuries resulting from past breach.
One analytical hurdle remains, however, in the path of an
AFDC recipient who relies upon section 145(2)(a) or 145(2)(b) of
the Restatement to recover as a third-party beneficiary. Both sections
are exceptions to the general rule that a contractor providing a
service intended to benefit the general public does not incur liabil-
ity to individual members of the public when he fails to perform. 276
Members of the general public are presumptively incidental ben-
eficiaries of intended public benefits. Thus, the exceptions stated in
section 145 assume sub silentio a distinction between benefits ad-
dressed to the general public and benefits intended for specific
individuals. Applying these two exceptions to AFDC recipients re-
quires an understanding of the tort and contract law that has
created this distinction between public and individual beneficiaries.
In tort actions, courts have not required governmental bodies
to exercise due care in the performance of duties owed only to the
general public.277 In Riss v. City of New York,278 for example, the
New York Court of Appeals held that a city has no duty to provide
adequate police protection even in response to an individual's re-
quest. Thus, if the federal government's obligation to enforce the
confidentiality requirements of the Social Security Act extends only
to the public generally, the government arguably would not be
liable for a specific AFDC recipient's injuries resulting from neg-
ligent enforcement. As a result, an AFDC recipient would not be
an intended beneficiary under subsection 145(2)(b).279 Similarly, in
contract actions, courts have refused to find that particular indi-
viduals are intended beneficiaries of government contracts that
benefit the public generally. 2811 Thus in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co. ,281 the New York Court of Appeals denied recovery to a
271 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 145(2) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
277 Prosser states: "Certain functions and activities, which can be performed adequately
only by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be 'governmental' in char-
acter, and so immune from tort liability." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 131, at 79 (4th ed. 1971).
278 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d.860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
279 See notes 269-75 and accompanying text supra.
288 Corbin stated: "In a number of cases it was said that the contract was not made for
the benefit of individual citizens but for the benefit of the municipality as a whole, and
that it was not intended that a citizen should have any right." 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 806, at 207 (1951).
281 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
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plaintiff who had suffered fire damage resulting from the defend-
ant water company's breach of its contract with the city to provide
adequate water pressure at fire hydrants. Under such an analysis,
an AFDC recipient would not be an intended beneficiary if the
state-federal AFDC contract were for the benefit of the public at
large.
AFDC recipients, however, are not the general public. They
constitute a class that is clearly defined by federal and state eligibil-
ity criteria. Although the public may benefit from the existence of
the AFDC program, it is the recipients who benefit from the condi-
tions the Social Security Act imposes on state acceptance of federal
funds. Subsection 602(a)(9), by its terms and legislative history, is
clearly intended to benefit an identifiable group-recipients about
whom information is on file-as opposed to the public at large.
The class of third-party beneficiaries of subsection 602(a)(9)
may at first appear so large as to be indistinguishable from the
public generally. In Weinberger v. New York Stock Exchange,2 82 how-
ever, the court recognized as an intended beneficiary a member of
a group potentially as large as the beneficiaries of subsection
602(a)(9). The court found the plaintiff investor in a member firm
of the New York Stock Exchange to bean intended beneficiary of
the Exchange's promise to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.283 Courts have also recognized prisoners28 4 and public hous-
ing tenants28 5 as intended beneficiaries of contracts. Moreover,
the rule that specific members of the public are incidental beneficiar-
ies of the government's obligation to provide police or fire protec-
tion has come under increasing attack.2 86
Most importantly, the policies underlying cases like Riss v. City
282 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
28 See notes 253-55 and accompanying text supra.
284 Blair v. Anderson, 325 A.2d 94 (Del. 1974).
285 See note 266 supra.
286 See, e.g., Harris v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs, 294 Ala. 606, 609-11, 320 So.
2d 624, 627-28 (1975) (individual member of public intended beneficiary of contract to
provide adequate water pressure at fire hydrant). See also Riss v. City of New York, 22
N.Y.2d 579, 592, 240 N.E.2d 860, 867, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 907 (1968) (dissenting opinion,
Keating, J.):
Some indication of the movement of the law against the existing rule can be
extracted from the fact that, whereas a few decades ago, the rule that there is no
duty to provide adequate police and fire protection was attacked only intermit-
tently, in recent years more and more insistently we have been asked to reject the
rule. An assault can be found now in almost every recent volume of the New York
Reports ....
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of New York 287 do not apply to the federal government's duty to
enforce subsection 602(a)(9). In Riss, the New York Court of Ap-
peals refused to find that the city had a duty to provide police
protection, even when specifically requested, because it did not
want to impose judicial review upon administrative allocation of
the police department's scarce resources.2 88 Congress, however, has
already indicated its desire to expend federal resources protecting
AFDC recipients28 9 by directing the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare to "approve any plan which fulfills the conditions
specified in [42 U.S.C. § 602(a)]. 29 ° If courts were to find that the
federal government owed a duty to individual AFDC recipients to
enforce the Social Security Act against the states, it would still not
be necessary for them to review the allocation of resources. Con-
gress has already commanded the allocation of resources for indi-
vidual protection. Thus, a court would simply determine whether
or not agents of the federal government enforced the Social Se-
curity Act with reasonable care.
Similarly, the policies against finding liability to individual ben-
eficiaries as part of the "terms of the promise" do not apply in the
AFDC situation. Regarding cases like H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co.,29 1 Corbin has written:
Perhaps the prevailing reason in the water cases has been
one of supposed public policy. The courts seem to fear that
water companies would be charged with stupendous losses out of
proportion to their compensation, that the attempt is being made
to hold them as insurers, and that the public service of supplying
water would be paralyzed by holding the companies under such
a liability 92
On one hand, states receive no compensation for administering
AFDC, other than the reduction in their own welfare expenditures
that federal AFDC funding makes possible. On the other, the
liabilities incurred by a water company insuring fire protection are
much greater than those assumed by a state insuring the confiden-
tiality of welfare records. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in the water
287 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). See text accompanying
notes 277-78 supra.
288 22 N.Y.2d at 581-83, 240 N.E.2d at 860-61, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 897-99.
289 See notes 256-58 and accompanying text supra.
290 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1970) (stopping payments upon
deviation from required provisions of plan).
291 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). See text accompanying notes 280-81 supra.
292 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 806, at 209 (1951).
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company cases can protect themselves by purchasing fire insur-
ance, but the AFDC recipient has no way to insulate himself from
the harm of public disclosure of the contents of his welfare file.
Finally, state welfare programs would not be paralyzed by the pos-
sibility of liability for breaching the confidentiality condition. States
have generally shown an interest in complying with the condition
by passing statutes that impose criminal sanctions for wrongful
disclosure293 and by objecting to court orders to produce rec-
ords.294 To these states, the possibility of liability would make little
difference. To the extent that states do not have this interest, how-
ever, courts should encourage concern for confidentiality by allow-
ing recipients to enforce the federal standards with suits for dam-
ages. Supposed fiscal paralysis, a matter of conjecture to begin
with, is no defense to liability for intentional wrongs committed by
state officers.295
In sum, both implied consensuality296 and the federal gov-
ernment's assumption of a duty to AFDC recipients297 support the
argument that welfare recipients are intended beneficiaries of con-
fidentiality rules. If the federal courts continue to refuse jurisdic-
tion and the state courts are hampered by sovereign immunity in
disclosure suits, contract theory could and should provide a rem-
edy for an obvious wrong.
John A. Malmberg
293 See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 31, § l101(c) ($500 fine and/or 6 months imprisonment);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 483 (Purdon) ($100 fine and/or 6 months imprisonment).
294 Paine v. Chick, 50 App. Div. 2d 686, 375 N.Y.S.2d 198 (3d Dep't 1975) (welfare de-
partment unsuccessfully contested court order to produce welfare records at defendant's
request in personal injury action brought by welfare recipient); State ex rel. Haugland v.
Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946) (welfare department unsuccessfully contested
order from juvenile court to produce records). Cf. McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147,
308 A.2d 888 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 970 (1974) (welfare department successfully
withheld records from newspaper).
29" The Weinberger court was not concerned that the New York Stock Exchange might
be paralyzed by liability to third-party beneficiaries, and the stock exchange's liability sel-
dom if ever arises out of intentional violation of the terms of its contract with the SEC.
296 See notes 263-68 and accompanying text supra.
2'9 See notes 269-75 and accompanying text supra.
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